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The United Nations and the situation in Haiti

From The United Nations Department of Public Information

Reference Paper (for informaiton; not an official record)


The President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was democratically elected on 16 December 1990 by 67 per cent of Haitian voters. He took office on 7 February 1991. The validity of the election was upheld by the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Caribbean community.

It was hoped that the election would put an end to a long period encompassing the dictatorship of Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier followed by five years of political instability under five different regimes, and mark the beginning of an era of democracy and economic and social progress. However, on 30 September 1991, President Aristide was overthrown in a coup d'etat, headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras, and forced into exile.


The violent and unconstitutional actions of the Haitian military forces were immediately and strongly condemned by the international community. On the same day, while the whereabouts of President Aristide were still unknown, the Permanent Council of OAS condemned the coup d'etat and its perpetrators. It demanded adherence to the Constitution and respect for the legitimate Government, the physical safety of the President and the rights of the Haitian people. It also called for the reinstatement of the President.

That same day, then United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar made a statement in which he expressed the hope that calm would soon be restored and that the democratic process would be pursued in accordance with the Constitution. The President of the Security Council associated himself with the statement.

Meeting on 2 October, the OAS Ministers for Foreign Affairs heard a statement by President Aristide, and on 3 October they adopted a resolution demanding his immediate reinstatement. The Ministers recommended the diplomatic, economic and financial isolation of the de facto authorities and the suspension of any aid except that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes. They decided to dispatch a mission to Haiti and urged the United Nations to consider the spirit and aims of the resolution.

On 3 October, President Aristide addressed the United Nations Security Council. The President of the Council made a statement condemning the coup, calling for the restoration of the legitimate Government, supporting the efforts of OAS and expressing the hope that the President of Haiti would soon return to his country and resume his functions.

On 4 October, a high-level OAS delegation arrived in Haiti and met with representatives of various groups within the country. The delegation's negotiations with the High Command of the Haitian Armed Forces were interrupted on 7 October, when soldiers ordered the delegation members to leave the country.

On 7 October, the two Chambers of the Haitian Parliament, under pressure from the military, named an Acting President, who in turn appointed, on 10 October, a Prime Minister.

The OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted, on 8 October, a second resolution in which they condemned the decision to replace the President illegally and declared unacceptable any Government that might result from that situation. They urged OAS member States to freeze the financial assets of the Haitian State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti, except for humanitarian aid. The Ministers called upon the Member States of the United Nations to adopt the same measures. They also decided to constitute, at the request of President Aristide, a civilian mission, known as OEA/DEMOC, to re-establish and strengthen constitutional democracy in Haiti.


On 11 October 1991, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 46/7, in which it condemned the illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti, the use of violence and military coercion and the violation of human rights in Haiti; affirmed as unacceptable any entity resulting from that illegal situation; and demanded the immediate restoration of the legitimate Government of President Aristide, the application of the Constitution and thus the full observance of human rights in Haiti.

The Assembly appealed to Member States to take measures in support of the OAS resolutions and emphasized that, when constitutional order was restored in Haiti, increased cooperation would be necessary to support the country's development efforts in order to strengthen its democratic institutions. The Assembly also requested the United Nations Secretary-General to consider providing the support sought by the OAS Secretary-General in implementing the mandates arising from the OAS resolutions.


The United Nations Secretary-General actively supported the intensive efforts by OAS and its mediator at the time, Mr. Ramirez Ocampo, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, aimed at finding a political solution to the Haitian crisis.

On July 15 1992, newly elected Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali informed the Security Council that he had accepted the offer of the then Secretary-General of OAS, Mr. Jo o Baena Soares, to include a United Nations participation in a mission to Haiti. The high-level mission led by the OAS Secretary-General visited Haiti from 18 to 21 August 1992. On 10 September, the United Nations Secretary-General informed the Council that his representative had taken part in the OAS mission and that the Haitian parties did not seem to have come closer together. He also reported that OAS was planning to deploy a first group of observers in Haiti and that it had decided to maintain the economic embargo. He concluded by saying that he intended to continue cooperating with OAS and stood ready to lend any other assistance.

On 3 November, the Secretary-General, in a report to the General Assembly, reviewed the efforts made by the international community to resolve the Haitian crisis. He also cited reports of a pattern of gross and widespread human rights abuses during the year since the coup d'etat in Haiti. As a result of the deteriorating political, economic and humanitarian situation, thousands of Haitians were fleeing their country.

On 24 November 1992, the General Assembly adopted resolution 47/20, in which, inter alia, it again demanded the restoration of the legitimate Government of President Aristide, together with the full application of the National Constitution and the full observance of human rights, and requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures , in order to assist, in cooperation with OAS, in the solution of the Haitian crisis.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General, on 11 December 1992, appointed Mr. Dante Caputo, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, as his Special Envoy for Haiti. On 13 January 1993, the OAS Secretary-General also appointed Mr. Caputo as his Special Envoy.


The Special Envoy held a series of preliminary consultations between 17 and 22 December 1992 in Washington, D.C., with President Aristide, and at Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, with the Coordinator and members of the Presidential Commission, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras, with the Prime Minister of the de facto Government, Mr. Marc Bazin, and with the Presidents of the two Chambers of the National Assembly of Haiti. Further discussions were held with President Aristide in early January 1993.

On 8 January 1993, President Aristide, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, requested, among other things, the following: (a) the deployment by the United Nations and OAS of an international civilian mission to monitor respect for human rights and the elimination of all forms of violence; and (b) the establishment of a process of dialogue among the Haitian parties, under the auspices of the Special Envoy, with a view to reaching agreements for the solution of the political crisis, the designation of a Prime Minister by the President to lead a Government of national concord aimed at the full restoration of democratic order in Haiti; agreements for the rehabilitation of Haitian institutions, including the reform of the judicial system, the professionalization of the armed forces and the separation of the police from the armed forces; international technical assistance for national reconstruction; and a system of guarantees to ensure a lasting solution. An identical letter was addressed to the Secretary-General of OAS.

After further meetings at Port-au-Prince on 16 and 17 January 1993, the Special Envoy received two letters, one from Lieutenant-General Cedras and the other from Mr. Bazin, accepting in principle an international civilian mission and a dialogue among the Haitian parties to resolve the political crisis in the country.

In a letter dated 18 January 1993 to President Aristide, the Secretary-General agreed to the United Nations participation in the International Civilian Mission for verifying respect for human rights and the eradication of all forms of violence in Haiti, subject to the approval of the General Assembly and under terms to be agreed jointly with OAS.

In the meantime, faced with the announcement by the de facto Government of Haiti that it was proceeding with the holding of elections for a third of the Senate, the Permanent Council of OAS adopted, on 13 January 1993, a declaration repudiating the proposed elections and declaring them to be illegitimate and obstructive of the efforts under way by OAS and the United Nations towards restoring the democratic institutional framework in Haiti. The United Nations Secretary-General supported the OAS declaration. However, his request to the de facto Haitian authorities that the elections be cancelled was not heeded.


Following the Special Envoy's consultations with the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and of OAS concerning the mandate of the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) and the modalities of its operations, the joint ideas were presented to and agreed upon by President Aristide. The terms of the agreement regarding the Mission were subsequently incorporated in an exchange of letters between the de facto Prime Minister, Mr. Bazin, and the Special Envoy on 9 February 1993.

Under the agreement, MICIVIH would verify respect for human rights as laid down in the Haitian Constitution and in the international instruments to which Haiti is a party, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. The Mission would devote special attention to the observance of the rights to life, to the integrity and security of the person, to personal liberty, to freedom of expression and to freedom of association. The Mission would be entitled to receive communications relating to alleged human rights violations, to visit freely any place or establishment, to enjoy entire freedom of movement within Haitian territory, to interview anybody freely and privately, to make recommendations to the authorities and verify their follow-up, to undertake a public information and education campaign on human rights and to use the mass media to the extent useful for the fulfilment of its mandate. It would be understood that the Mission was authorized to resort to other international procedures for the promotion and protection of human rights.

The agreement also provided that once the Mission had been deployed, the Special Envoy would undertake discussions regarding ways and means through which the United Nations and OAS might assist in reinforcing democracy, accelerating economic development and professionalizing national institutions, in particular, the judicial system, the armed forces and the police.

In his 24 March 1993 report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General recommended that the Assembly establish the United Nations component of the joint International Civilian Mission in Haiti. The United Nations component of the Mission would comprise some 200 international staff, including 133 human rights observers. OAS would provide another 133 international observers, plus other required personnel for its component. The report also contained the proposals submitted by the team of three international human rights experts, which had visited Haiti from 15 to 22 February 1993, including its recommendations on the deployment of the Mission throughout Haiti, the modalities of its operation and its needs in terms of personnel and resources.

On 20 April 1993, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, its resolution 47/20B approving the Secretary-General's report and authorizing the United Nations participation, jointly with OAS, in the International Civilian Mission to Haiti. The Assembly reiterated the need for an early return of President Aristide to resume his constitutional functions as President and strongly supported the process of political dialogue under the auspices of the Special Envoy with a view to resolving the political crisis in Haiti. It reiterated that any entity resulting from actions of the de facto regime, including the partial elections to the Parliament in January 1993, was illegitimate.

By other provisions of the resolution, the General Assembly considered that any modifications regarding the economic measures recommended by the ad hoc meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers should be considered according to progress in the observance of human rights and in the solution of the political crisis. It reaffirmed the international community's commitment to increased technical, economic and financial cooperation when constitutional order was restored in Haiti, in order to strengthen institutions responsible for dispensing justice and guaranteeing democracy, political stability and economic development.

Pending the General Assembly's approval, the United Nations Secretary-General dispatched to Haiti on 13 February 1993 an advance team and a survey group to prepare for the deployment of the United Nations component of the Mission. On 14 February, an initial group of 40 observers from OAS arrived in Haiti, where they joined forces with a small team of OAS observers that had been in Port-au-Prince since September 1992.

The Mission operated under a Head of Mission, appointed jointly by the United Nations and OAS and reporting to the Special Envoy. Its headquarters was established at Port-au-Prince with 14 regional offices and sub-offices across the country. Deployment in the provinces began on 5 March 1993. By the end of March, the Mission had a team in each of the nine departments of the country. It was estimated that the financial requirements for the United Nations participation in the Mission in 1993 would amount to approximately $24 million.

On 3 June 1993, MICIVIH submitted its first report on the human rights situation in Haiti. The report, which was of an interim nature, concentrated on such issues as violations of the right to integrity and security of person linked to violations of the right to freedom of expression and association; deaths in detention, disappearances and arbitrary executions; and other violations of the right to physical integrity and individual security.


In the meantime, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy conducted consultations with the parties concerned aimed at seeking a political solution to the Haitian crisis. The immediate objective of those consultations was to achieve agreement on three main issues, namely the return of President Aristide to Haiti, the appointment of a Prime Minister to head a Government of national concord and the resolution of the question of amnesty. Other critical issues included technical assistance for the economic and institutional reconstruction of the country, the nature and duration of the international presence in Haiti, coupled with international guarantees to ensure compliance with the agreements.

Despite the mounting international pressure, however, the negotiating process undertaken by Mr. Caputo was rejected by the de facto authorities and the military command in Haiti when they refused to accept the key elements of the proposed framework for a settlement.

On 7 June 1993, the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, in which he stated that despite the efforts of the international community, constitutional order had not yet been re-established in Haiti because the de facto authorities continued to obstruct all initiatives. In light of that situation, the letter went on, the Government of Haiti requested the Security Council to make universal and mandatory the sanctions against the de facto authorities adopted at the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of OAS and recommended in the General Assembly resolutions, giving priority to an embargo on petroleum products and the supply of arms and munitions.

On 16 June, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, unanimously adopted resolution 841 (1993), by which it decided to impose an oil and arms embargo against Haiti as part of the continuing international effort to restore constitutional rule to that country. The President of the Council, in a statement on behalf of its members, said that the adoption of the resolution was warranted by the unique and exceptional situation in Haiti and should not be regarded as constituting a precedent.

The Council decided that the sanctions would enter into force on 23 June 1993 unless the Secretary-General, having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of OAS, reported to the Council that, in the light of the results of negotiations, the measures were no longer warranted. At any time after such reporting, should the de facto authorities in Haiti fail to comply in good faith with their undertakings in those negotiations, the sanctions measures would enter into force immediately.

The resolution obliged States to prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related materiel including military vehicles, police equipment and their spare parts, to any person or body in Haiti. States were also to prevent any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promoted or were calculated to promote such sale or supply. States were also required to freeze all funds in the name of the Government of Haiti or the de facto authorities there, as well as those funds controlled directly or indirectly by the two wherever located or organized.


On 21 June 1993, the Special Envoy, Mr. Caputo, received a letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General Cedras, accepting the Special Envoy's earlier invitation to him to initiate a dialogue with President Aristide with a view to resolving the Haitian crisis.

On 3 July, after almost a week of talks on Governors Island, New York City, President Aristide and Lieutenant-General Cedras signed an agreement containing arrangements which the parties felt paved the way to a satisfactory solution to the Haitian crisis and the beginning of a process of national reconciliation.

Under the Agreement, President Aristide was to appoint a new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to replace Lieutenant-General Cedras, who would take early retirement. President Aristide was to return to Haiti on 30 October 1993. The parties agreed to a political dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations and OAS, between representatives of political parties represented in the Parliament, with the participation of representatives of the Presidential Commission. The objectives of the political dialogue were to reach a political truce and promote a social pact to create conditions necessary to ensure a peaceful transition; to establish procedures to enable the Haitian Parliament to resume its normal functioning; to reach an agreement enabling the Parliament to confirm the Prime Minister as speedily as possible; and to reach an agreement permitting the adoption of the laws necessary for ensuring the transition. The parties further agreed that the President would nominate a Prime Minister, to be confirmed by the legally reconstituted Parliament. Following his confirmation and assumption of office, all United Nations and OAS sanctions were to be suspended. Other provisions dealt with issues of amnesty, the creation of a new police force and international cooperation.

The Agreement specifically requested the presence of United Nations personnel in Haiti to assist in modernizing the armed forces and establishing the new police force. The Secretary-General, after consultation with the constitutional Government of Haiti, was to report to the Security Council with his recommendations on that aspect of the implementation of the Agreement. The United Nations and OAS were called upon to verify the fulfilment of all the commitments set out in the Agreement. The Secretary-General entrusted the verification to his Special Envoy and asked him to report regularly to him and to the Secretary-General of OAS.


On 14 July 1993, representatives of political forces and parliamentary blocs, together with the members of the Presidential Commission which represented President Aristide in Haiti, began the inter-Haitian political dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations and OAS.

At the conclusion of the talks in New York on 16 July, the parties signed a new document, known as the New York Pact, which provided for a six-month truce to guarantee a smooth and peaceful transition in their country. In agreeing to the truce, the parties undertook to promote and guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to refrain from any action that might lead to violence or disrupt the transition to democracy. They also undertook not to table motions of no-confidence against the new Government of national concord, in so far as it respected the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, or to obstruct the work of the Parliament.

The signatories invited President Aristide to appoint a new Prime Minister as soon as possible, and undertook to ensure that laws necessary for the transition of power were passed on the basis of an emergency procedure. They agreed that the members of Parliament elected as a result of the contested elections of 18 January 1993 would voluntarily refrain from occupying their parliamentary seats until the Conciliation Commission had rendered its verdict on this issue.

The United Nations and OAS agreed to make two experts available to help prepare and implement an act establishing the Conciliation Commission.


In his letter to the Secretary-General on 15 July, the President of the Security Council confirmed the readiness of the Council to suspend the sanctions imposed against Haiti under Security Council resolution 841 (1993) immediately after the Prime Minister had been ratified and had assumed the functions of that office in Haiti. It was agreed that provisions would be made for the automatic termination of such suspension if the parties to the Agreement or any authorities in Haiti failed to comply in good faith with the Agreement. The Council also declared its readiness to terminate the sanctions, upon receipt of a report from the United Nations Secretary-General immediately after the return of President Aristide to Haiti.

On 25 August 1993, the Haitian Parliament ratified the appointment by President Aristide of Mr. Robert Malval as Prime Minister-designate. This led the Security Council, on the Secretary-General's recommendation, to suspend immediately the oil and arms embargo against Haiti as well as the freeze on funds. The Council did so by unanimously adopting resolution 861 (1993) of 27 August in which it also confirmed its readiness to reimpose sanctions if the terms of the Governors Island Agreement were not fully implemented.


The Governors Island Agreement included provision for United Nations assistance for modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a new police force. In his 25 August report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General outlined his plans in this regard.

The Secretary-General recommended the dispatch to Haiti of a mission consisting of 567 civilian police monitors, 60 military trainers and a military construction unit for an initial period of six months.

Although the Haitian Constitution provides for a police force separate from the Armed Forces, the responsibilities of the Armed Forces of Haiti included both military and police functions. The Secretary-General said that, pending the creation of a new police force, United Nations civilian police monitors would help the Government in monitoring the activities of those members of the Armed Forces involved in carrying out police functions, provide guidance and advice, monitor the conduct of police operations, and ensure that legal requirements were fully met.

As to the modernization of the Armed Forces, the Secretary-General stated that the military training teams would provide training to officers and non-commissioned officers in non-lethal skills in order to prepare them for what would become their primary mission, including disaster relief, search and rescue, and surveillance of borders and coastal waters.

The military construction unit would work with the Haitian military in such areas as conversion of certain military facilities to civilian use and renovation of medical facilities.

The Secretary-General said that the mission would be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, namely the Special Envoy, Mr. Dante Caputo, who would also oversee the activities of the International Civilian Mission and who would coordinate the activities of the two missions.

On 31 August, the Security Council, by its resolution 862 (1993), approved the dispatch of an advance team to prepare for the possible deployment of the proposed United Nations mission to Haiti.


An advance team, headed by Mr. Caputo, travelled to Haiti on 8 September 1993. On the basis of the Team's findings, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council, on 21 September, a report containing further clarifications, including an estimate of the cost and scope of the mission, a time-frame for its implementation and conclusion, as well as recommendations on ensuring coordination between the United Nations and OAS.

In analysing the political situation in Haiti, the Secretary-General noted that both sides continued to be divided by deep mistrust and suspicion. The political and social climate in the country continued to be characterized by widespread violations of human rights and by other instances of violence. The Secretary-General shared the view of his Special Envoy that in these circumstances there was an urgent need to demonstrate through concrete steps the commitment of the international community to the solution of the Haitian crisis . He recommended, therefore, that the Security Council approve the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for an initial period of six months.

On 23 September, the Security Council, by its resolution 867 (1993), authorized the establishment and immediate dispatch of UNMIH for a period of six months. Extension of the mandate of the Mission beyond seventy-five days was made contingent upon a review by the Security Council of substantive progress towards the implementation of political agreements reached. The Council called upon all factions in Haiti to renounce publicly violence as a means of political expression.


In accordance with resolution 867 (1993) and after necessary preparations and consultations, the advance team of UNMIH consisting of 53 military and 51 police personnel was deployed in Port-au-Prince in the period September October 1993. However, when the ship, Harlan County, carrying 220 personnel of the United Nations military contingent arrived in Port-au-Prince on 11 October, armed civilians (known as attaches ) created disturbances in the area of the seaport and prevented the ship from landing. In addition, they threatened journalists and diplomats waiting to meet the contingent.

On the same day, the Security Council issued a statement deeply deploring the events of 11 October and reiterating that serious and consistent non-compliance with the Governors Island Agreement would prompt it to reinstate the oil and arms embargo against Haiti. In this context, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report urgently whether the incidents of 11 October constituted such non-compliance by the Armed Forces of Haiti.

Following the departure of the Harlan County, the other members of UNMIH, the bulk of the MICIVIH staff and non-essential personnel of international agencies left Haiti. Many foreign nationals acted likewise, while Haitians living in the capital attempted to flee to the countryside. The Secretary-General's Special Representative remained at Port-au-Prince until 6 November 1993.


The Secretary-General, in accordance with the Council's request, reported back on 13 October. He called attention to the repeatedly observed lack of will on the part of the command of the Armed Forces of Haiti to facilitate the deployment and operation of UNMIH and to administrative obstacles created to delay the start of the Mission. He also cited incidents demonstrating a lack of will to act against attaches who were terrorizing the population through such actions as assassinations, attacks on the offices of the Prime Minister and the general strike against UNMIH. Moreover, police had facilitated and, in some cases, participated in the actions of the armed civilians.

The Secretary-General went on to say that most of the instructions issued by the Government of Haiti to the Haitian Armed Forces and police had not been carried out. That was a clear violation of the principle of the subordination of military forces to civilian authority , which was a central feature of the Governors Island Agreement. The incidents described in the report reflected a lack of will to cooperate fully with the peaceful transition to a democratic society, as well as the clear and explicit intent to prevent the democratic process, as accepted in that Agreement, from taking its course.

The Secretary-General stated that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti and the police chief and commander of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area have failed to fulfil the commitments entered into by General Cedras in his capacity as co-signatory of the Governors Island Agreement . The Secretary-General declared it necessary to terminate the suspension of the oil and arms embargo and the freeze on funds first imposed by resolution 841 (1993).

The Security Council, by its resolution 873 (1993) of 13 October, decided to reimpose its oil and arms embargo against Haiti and the freeze on funds as of 2359 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST) on 18 October unless the parties to the Governors Island Agreement and other authorities in Haiti implemented in full the agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and enable UNMIH to carry out its mandate. The Council said it would also consider additional sanctions if they continued to impede the activities of UNMIH or to refuse to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions and the Governors Island Agreement.

Despite diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and mounting international pressure, the military leaders in Haiti continued to defy the Governors Island Agreement. Moreover, on 14 October, the Minister of Justice in the Government of President Aristide, Francois-Guy Malary, was assassinated. In a letter dated 15 October, President Aristide requested the Security Council to call on Member States to take the necessary measures to strengthen the provisions of resolution 873 (1993) .

On 16 October, the Security Council, by its resolution 875 (1993), called upon Member States to ensure the strict implementation of the oil and arms embargo against Haiti, and in particular to halt and inspect ships travelling towards Haiti in order to verify their cargoes and destinations. The Council also confirmed that it was prepared to consider further necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the provisions of relevant Council resolutions.

Reaffirming that, in these unique and exceptional circumstances , the failure of the military authorities in Haiti to fulfil their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, the Council called on Member States, acting nationally or through regional arrangements and in cooperation with the legitimate Government of Haiti, to use appropriate measures to implement the sanctions called for under resolutions 841 (1993) and 873 (1993).

On 30 October 1993, after the deadline for the return of President Aristide to Haiti had passed, the Security Council, in a statement by its President, condemned the fact that Lieutenant-General Cedras and the Haitian military authorities had so far not fulfilled their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement, and deplored their fostering and perpetuation of a political and security environment which prevented the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti as provided for in the Agreement.

The Council reaffirmed that the Governors Island Agreement remained fully in force as the only valid framework for the solution of the crisis in Haiti. It further reaffirmed its determination to maintain and enforce sanctions on Haiti until the Agreement's commitments were honoured, and to consider strengthening them if the military authorities continued to interrupt the democratic transition.


The Secretary-General and his Special Representative, supported by several United Nations Member States ( Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti ), in consultation with the OAS Secretary-General, continued to work intensively to break the impasse and promote agreement between the parties on measures which would make it possible to resume implementation of the Governors Island Agreement.

An important step forward was taken on 14 16 January 1994, when President Aristide convened a conference in Miami, Florida (United States), to which all the political groups that had signed the New York Pact were invited. At that conference a consensus emerged on a sequence of steps to be taken to break the deadlock. In the course of February 1994, further consultations took place in Washington between leading members of both Houses of the Haitian Parliament, representing all political tendencies in that Parliament. On 19 February, the Secretary-General received a letter from a representative group of those Parliamentarians containing a plan for resolving the crisis. On 3 March 1994, this plan was endorsed in a resolution by the Chamber of Deputies of the Haitian Parliament. The plan as presented to the Secretary-General by its authors was transmitted to the Security Council on 20 February 1994. On that occasion, the Secretary-General stated that he considered it to constitute a significant development.

The plan, which was subsequently set out in detail in a letter received on 23 February 1994, provided for the appointment of a Prime Minister, the departure of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti, a vote on the amnesty law, as well as the adoption, after the installation of the new Government, of a law concerning the establishment of a police force, and the return of President Aristide to Haiti.

On 5 March 1994, the Secretary-General met with President Aristide. During the meeting, the President expressed his opposition to this initiative. He further expressed his position in a 7 March 1994 letter to the Secretary-General. Before appointing a new Prime Minister, President Aristide wished to bring about the departure of the leaders of the coup d'etat, the adoption of the laws provided for within the framework of the New York Pact and the deployment of UNMIH.


A small group of administrative personnel of MICIVIH remained in Port-au-Prince following the evacuation of the bulk of its personnel in October 1993. The Executive Director of MICIVIH returned to Port-au-Prince after four weeks of absence. Twenty-two United Nations and OAS observers returned on 26 January 1994, then six others on 2 February and an additional ten on 13 April, bringing the number of observers to thirty-eight.

MICIVIH reported an alarming increase in violence in Haiti. There had been an outbreak of violence in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas, where the number of murders remained at a very high level, with the persistence of grave violations of human rights and, in particular, extrajudicial executions, suspicious deaths and enforced disappearances. There were a number of mutilations and many of those killed were supporters of President Aristide. In certain cases of suspicious death, the Mission obtained information leading to the conclusion that the culprits were members of the Armed Forces, their auxiliaries or members of the Front revolutionnaire pour l'avancement et le progres en Haiti (FRAPH). In other cases, testimony pointed to armed civilians and left it unclear whether it was a question of attaches or of armed bands acting with the complicity of the Armed Forces.


The Security Council, by its resolution 867 (1993) which authorized the establishment of UNMIH for a period of six months, requested the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the mission by 10 December 1993. The Secretary-General reported on 26 November 1993. He noted the Haitian military authorities' continued obstruction of the deployment of UNMIH and their failure to permit the mission to begin its work, and concluded that the mandate entrusted to UNMIH could not be implemented until there was a clear and substantial change of attitude on the part of the Haitian military leaders.

On 10 December 1993, the President of the Council addressed a letter to the Secretary-General containing the decision by the Council to continue the mandate of UNMIH for the full six-month period, that is until 23 March 1994.

In his further reports submitted to the Security Council on 19 January and 18 March 1994, the Secretary-General stated that notwithstanding the continued efforts, there had been no change in the prevailing situation in Haiti that would have allowed the reactivation of UNMIH . In these circumstances, he suggested that the Council might wish to consider authorizing the extension of UNMIH's mandate for a period of three months. In his opinion, this would allow for the possibility of reactivating the mission with a minimum of delay, should the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement be resumed.

The Security Council, by its resolution 905 (1994) adopted on 23 March 1994, decided to extend the mandate of UNMIH until 30 June 1994.


On 29 April 1994, the Secretary-General, in a report to the General Assembly, recommended that the Assembly extend the mandate and financing of the United Nations component of MICIVIH for one year. In the report, he stated that although the Mission had been unable to rectify a distressing situation in Haiti, it had shed light on certain events there and denounced human rights abuses that would not otherwise have been disclosed.

The Secretary-General went on to say that President Aristide could only be returned to power, and democracy restored in Haiti, if both sides made constructive and accepted concessions . He noted that a recent initiative by a group of Haitian Parliamentarians which had been supported by the United Nations and OAS had not been endorsed by President Aristide. Meanwhile, unity among the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti had waned and Security Council sanctions, reimposed in October 1993, had not been effective.

The Secretary-General said the international community's role had changed from that of mediator between the parties to that of sole agent responsible for finding and implementing a solution to the deadlock. There was a danger that the international community would have too extensive a mission, allowing the parties to shirk their own responsibilities in the negotiating process.

Given that negotiations had yielded no significant progress, the Secretary-General recommended that a more specifically Haitian solution be found. For this reason, the participants should resume an effective role in this process, and the international community and especially those countries most directly concerned should restore a unified approach in the negotiations.

The Secretary-General concluded his report by saying that without positive change, both from the Haitian side and from the international community, it was difficult to determine what additional efforts the United Nations could undertake to resolve the serious crisis prevailing in the country. However, as long as material circumstances would allow, the Organization must maintain its presence through MICIVIH and ensure the continuity of humanitarian assistance to Haiti.

The General Assembly, in its resolution 48/27B of 8 July 1994, authorized the extension of the mandate of the United Nations component of MICIVIH for an additional year, and requested the Secretary-General to expedite and strengthen the presence of the Mission in Haiti. At the end of June, MICIVIH had 104 international staff including 70 observers.


On 6 May, the Security Council adopted resolution 917 (1994), by which it decided to impose a comprehensive set of sanctions against Haiti, which should take effect no later than 2359 hours EST on 21 May, and listed a number of specific conditions for their termination. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it no later than 19 May on steps the military had taken to comply with the terms of the resolution.

The military authorities in Haiti, however, continued to defy the will of the international community. Moreover, they supported the installation, on 11 May, of Supreme Court Judge Emile Jonassaint as provisional President.

The Security Council, in a Presidential statement issued on 11 May, strongly condemned the attempt to replace the legitimate President of Haiti and reaffirmed the Council members' commitment to the restoration of democracy in Haiti and to the return of President Aristide.

After the Secretary-General reported on 19 May that the military authorities had not taken any steps to comply with resolution 917 (1994), and, on the contrary, supported the illegal attempt to replace the legitimate President, the new sanctions against Haiti took effect as scheduled.

In order to tighten the cordon around the island, the United States deployed two additional navy vessels off Haiti, bringing to eight the number of United States ships working with one Canadian, one Argentine and one Dutch ship. A French vessel was also expected to arrive.

In addition to tightening the sea cordon around the island, steps were taken on land to enforce the sanctions against Haiti. At the request of the Dominican Republic, the Secretary-General dispatched a team of technical experts to assess the situation on the Dominican/Haitian border. On the basis of the team's report, on 9 June the Secretary-General communicated his observations and recommendations to the Government of the Dominican Republic.


On 20 June, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that no progress had been made towards the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. On the contrary, tensions in Haiti increased as a result of the installation of an illegitimate government, the growing impact of economic sanctions, the continued repression and the humanitarian crisis.

The provisional President announced that he would be organizing elections by the end of 1994 and would leave office in February 1995, after the election of a new President in January 1995. On 11 June, he declared a state of emergency on the grounds that the nation was facing extreme danger and risks of invasion. Despite the electoral timetable, no legislative action was taken to prepare for the legislative elections due in November 1994.

As to human rights, the Secretary-General reported that the situation had deteriorated sharply, with new patterns of repression such as the abduction and rape of family members of political activists. In a growing number of politically related killings, the implication of members of the Armed Forces or of FRAPH was established.

The humanitarian situation in Haiti also continued to deteriorate in spite of efforts by the United Nations and OAS, non-governmental organizations and bilateral donors.

In his further report submitted to the Security Council on 28 June, the Secretary-General stated that the continued deterioration of the situation in Haiti had substantially changed the circumstances under which UNMIH had been planned. The Council might wish to consider modifying the original mandate of the Mission. The Secretary-General recommended that the mandate of UNMIH be extended for a period of one month, to allow for consultations on the possible strengthening of UNMIH and its role in overall attempts to find a solution to the Haitian crisis.

In that report, the Secretary-General also recalled that in the statement of conclusions adopted at their meeting in New York on 3 June 1994, the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti had expressed their determination to promote the full deployment of UNMIH when conditions permitted and envisaged the reconfiguration and strengthening of the Mission.

The Ad Hoc Meeting on Haiti of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of OAS held during the twenty-fourth session of the OAS General Assembly at Belem, Brazil, unanimously adopted on 9 June 1994 a resolution which called on all Member States to support measures by the United Nations to strengthen UNMIH in order to assist in the restoration of democracy through the professionalization of the Armed Forces of Haiti and the training of a new police, to help maintain essential civil order and protect the personnel of international and other organizations involved in human rights and humanitarian efforts in Haiti.

On 30 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 933 (1994) deciding to extend the mandate of UNMIH until 31 July 1994 and requesting the Secretary-General to report to the Council with specific recommendations on the strength, composition, cost and duration of UNMIH, appropriate to its expansion and deployment after the departure of the senior Haitian military leadership.


On 11 July, the de facto authorities in Haiti delivered to the Executive Director of MICIVIH in Port-au-Prince a decree of the provisional President declaring the international staff of MICIVIH undesirable and giving them 48 hours to leave Haitian territory.

On the same day, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Acting Secretary-General of OAS issued a joint statement resolutely condemning this illegal action. The Security Council also issued a statement condemning this decision of the de facto authorities stressing that this action further reinforced the Council's determination to bring about a rapid and definitive solution to the crisis.

On 12 July, the Secretary-General informed the General Assembly and the Security Council of his decision, made in consultation with OAS, to evacuate MICIVIH staff from Haiti for security considerations. Both United Nations and OAS personnel of MICIVIH left Haiti on 13 July.


On 15 July, as requested by Security Council resolution 933 (1994), the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on a proposed expanded force in Haiti. In the report, he outlined its tasks, strength and concept of operations, and presented to the Council three options for the establishment of such a force. The Secretary-General supported action under Chapter VII of the Charter by a multinational force in order to ensure the return of the legitimate President and to assist the legitimate Government of Haiti in the maintenance of public order.

In his periodic report on the situation in Haiti dated 26 July, the Secretary-General stated that the situation in the country had deteriorated further as a result of actions taken by the illegal government of Mr. Emile Jonassaint. The human rights situation remained worrisome; reports coming out of the country indicated a continuation of the abuses being committed against Haitians. The humanitarian situation was becoming even more difficult, particularly for the poorest sectors of the population.

On 31 July 1994, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted resolution 940 (1994) which welcomed the Secretary-General's report of 15 July. The Council authorized Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of the military leadership, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate Government authorities.

Under the terms of the resolution, the multinational force would terminate its mission and an expanded, strengthened UNMIH would assume the full range of its functions when a secure and stable environment had been established and UNMIH had the capability and structure to assume those functions. That determination would be made by the Council, on the basis of recommendations from Member States participating in the multinational force and from the Secretary-General.

The Council also approved the establishment of an advance team of UNMIH to monitor the operations of the multinational force. The team would also assess requirements and prepare for the deployment of UNMIH.

The Council extended the mandate of UNMIH for a period of six months and increased its troop level to 6,000. It established the objective of completing UNMIH's mission not later that February 1996. Under its revised mandate, UNMIH would assist in sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and the protection of international personnel and key installations; and in the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force. It would also assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities, and, when requested by them, monitored by the United Nations, in cooperation with OAS.


In August, as a personal initiative aimed at the peaceful implementation of resolution 940 (1994), the Secretary-General dispatched a United Nations official with an exploratory mission in order to consider the possibility of sending to Haiti a high-level delegation which would hold discussions with the military authorities. However, the military authorities refused to meet with the envoy.

The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the mission of his special envoy had not achieved its objectives. He was suspending these efforts unless the Council gave him a new mandate or the situation changed. However, he would continue to seek ways to implement resolution 940 (1994) peacefully.

The President of the Security Council, in a statement to correspondents, deplored the rejection by the de facto authorities of the Secretary-General's initiative, and reiterated its condemnation of repression, systematic violence and violations of international humanitarian law in Haiti.

On 15 September, the President of the United States, William Clinton, stated that all diplomatic efforts had been exhausted and, in accordance with Security Council resolution 940 (1994), force might be used to remove the military leadership from power in Haiti and ensure the return of the democratic Government of President Aristide. The President stated that more than 20 countries had agreed to join the United States in a multinational force.

On 17 September, in a final diplomatic effort, the President of the United States sent to Haiti a high-level mission, headed by former President Jimmy Carter. Faced with imminent invasion and after two days of intensive talks, the Haitian military leaders agreed to resign when a general amnesty would be voted into law by the Haitian Parliament, or by 15 October 1994, whichever was earlier. Under the agreement, the Haitian military and police forces would cooperate with the multinational force in its efforts to establish and maintain a stable and secure environment during the transitional period.


On 19 September 1994, in a first phase of the military operation authorized by Security Council resolution 940 (1994), the lead elements of the 28-nation multinational force, spearheaded by United States troops, landed in Haiti without opposition. Upon his arrival in Haiti on the same day, Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton, the Commander of the force, coordinated the entry of the force with Haiti's military leaders.

The Secretary-General issued a statement welcoming the fact that a military intervention in Haiti had been averted and that conditions had been created for the peaceful implementation of resolution 940 (1994). In the statement, he said that an advance group of United Nations military observers would be dispatched to Haiti shortly and that he was considering the early redeployment of MICIVIH.

On 27 September, the multinational force submitted to the Security Council its first report summarizing the first week of operations of the force in Haiti. The report stated that activities of the force constituted the foundation for establishing the secure and stable environment necessary to restore and maintain democracy in Haiti. There was also evidence that the force was on its way towards establishing the conditions necessary for the full implementation of resolution 940 (1994).

The second report of the multinational force was submitted to the Security Council on 10 October. According to the report, which summarized the second and third weeks of operations, the overall situation in Haiti was relatively quiet, with some incidents of violence among Haitians. The force continued to search aggressively for and seize weapons caches, to protect public safety and to expand its presence in the countryside. The report stated that the force had made enough progress in establishing a secure and stable environment to allow it to be drawn down from its peak of 21,000 troops. Substantial progress was also made in re-establishing democracy in Haiti.


On 19 September, Mr. Dante Caputo, having cited the changing context of the situation in Haiti, resigned as the Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and OAS for Haiti. The Secretary-General received the resignation with deep regret and expressed to Mr. Caputo his thanks for the courage and devotion he had lent to the discharge of his duties.

To replace Mr. Caputo, the Secretary-General appointed, on 23 September, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, as his Special Representative for Haiti.


The first group of UNMIH's advance team consisting of 12 United Nations military observers arrived in Haiti on 23 September. The Chief Military Observer established liaison with the Commander of the multinational force and the appropriate coordination mechanisms were put in place.

The tasks of the team included: coordinating with the multinational force in preparation for the full deployment of UNMIH, monitoring the operations of the multinational force, making its good offices available as required and reporting to the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 940 (1994).

On 29 September 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 944 (1994), requested the Secretary-General to ensure the immediate completion of the deployment of the observers and other elements of the sixty-person UNMIH advance team. It also encouraged him, in consultation with the Secretary-General of OAS, to facilitate the immediate return to Haiti of MICIVIH.

By other provisions of the resolution, the Council decided to lift the sanctions imposed on Haiti, beginning at 0001 am EST on the day after the return to Haiti of President Aristide.

On 18 October, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that with the arrival in Port-au-Prince of seven additional members of the advance team on 30 September and 30 more personnel on 5 October, it had become fully operational.

In the report, the Secretary-General stated that the advance team had observed that the multinational force had made progress towards achieving objectives set out in Security Council resolution 940 (1994), while using minimum force. The great majority of the Haitian population welcomed the force, but might be developing unrealistically high expectations of what it would do.

The Secretary-General further noted that in preparation for the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH, the advance team's military component had established a joint working group with the force. The transition could only take place when a secure and stable environment had been established, and when UNMIH's strength and structure were adequate for it to assume its functions. The advance team's tasks would expire when the force had completed its mission and when UNMIH had assumed the full range of its functions.


On 28 September 1994, President Aristide convened an extraordinary session of the Haitian Parliament to consider draft legislation on an amnesty. On 10 October, after the Parliament had passed the amnesty legislation, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras resigned as Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces. Other members of the military leadership, Brigadier-General Philippe Biamby and Colonel Michel Francois, also submitted their resignations. The President of Panama, at the request of President Aristide, agreed to give asylum to Lieutenant-General Cedras and Brigadier-General Biamby. Earlier, Colonel Francois had gone to the Dominican Republic.

The Secretary-General issued a statement expressing his satisfaction at the resignation of the military leadership in Haiti, and his hope that this step would facilitate the return to power of President Aristide and the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

On 15 October, after the departure of the military leadership, President Aristide returned to Haiti and resumed his functions, after three years of enforced exile. The Secretary-General welcomed the long-awaited return of the President and the resumption of the democratic process in Haiti.

On the same day, the Security Council, by its resolution 948 (1994), also welcomed the return of President Aristide and, with his return, the lifting of sanctions at 0001 am EST on 16 October.

The Council expressed full support for efforts by President Aristide, democratic leaders in Haiti, and the legitimate organs of the restored Government to bring Haiti out of the crisis and return it to the democratic community of nations. Commending the efforts of all States, organizations and individuals who had contributed to that outcome, the Council recognized in particular the efforts of the multinational force in creating the conditions necessary for the return of democracy in Haiti. It also expressed its support for the deployment of the advance team of UNMIH, and urged that cooperation continue between the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and OAS, especially regarding the rapid return to Haiti of MICIVIH.


On 25 October, President Aristide designated Mr. Smarck Michel the new Prime Minister. His appointment was ratified by both Chambers of the Parliament on 4 November and his platform was approved unanimously in the Senate on 6 November and by overwhelming majority in the Chamber of Deputies on 7 November. The new Government took office on 8 November 1994.

From 23 to 29 October, the Secretary-General's Special Representative visited Haiti and had a series of discussions dealing with the situation on the ground, the operation of the multinational force and conditions for the transition from the multinational force to UNMIH.

On 15 November, the Secretary-General himself paid a visit to Haiti. During the discussion with President Aristide, a number of issues were addressed including national reconciliation, the reinforcement of democratic institutions and the revitalization of the Haitian economy, as well as the forthcoming legislative and local elections. The Secretary-General assured President Aristide that the United Nations, in collaboration with OAS, would continue to assist Haiti on the road to national reconciliation, political stability and reconstruction.


In the meantime, the advance team of UNMIH reported that the multinational force continued to operate smoothly towards achieving its objectives under resolution 940 (1994), with few incidents and with evident widespread acceptance by the Haitian population. No acts of intimidation or violence against the United Nations or other international presence were reported. In addition to monitoring the operations of the multinational force, the military and police personnel of the advance team were engaged in on-site planning for the transition from the force to UNMIH.

On 21 November, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that discussions were under way between the United Nations, the Government of Haiti, the Government of the United States and other interested parties to assure a smooth transition. The issues being addressed included the training of the Haitian police, the timetable for forthcoming legislative elections, and the establishment of a secure and stable environment. The Secretary-General noted that of particular concern was the setting up of an interim Haitian police pending the creation of a National Police.

The head of the UNMIH advance team believed that the strength of the team should be increased in order to further facilitate planning of the Mission, identification of conditions required for the transition and, most important, preparation for the actual transition. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council authorize expansion of the advance team up to 500 members to allow it to be progressively strengthened so that it would be fully prepared to enter the transition period.

On 29 November, the Security Council, by its resolution 964 (1994) authorized the Secretary-General to strengthen progressively the advance team of UNMIH up to 500 personnel. The Council welcomed the positive developments in Haiti since the deployment of the multinational force, and the establishment of a joint working group to prepare for the transition by the UNMIH advance team and the force. The Secretary-General was requested to inform the Council at regular intervals on increases in the strength of UNMIH's advance team. 1


The core group of MICIVIH returned to Haiti on 22 October 1994 to join the Executive Director of the Mission, Mr. Colin Granderson, and the staff of the Office of Human Rights, who had arrived on 6 October to evaluate the conditions for a return of MICIVIH. The activities of the Mission resumed on 26 October with the reopening of an office in Port-au-Prince.

In the meantime, a joint United Nations/OAS Working Group on MICIVIH was set up to look at the future of the Mission in terms of its redeployment and possible expansion of its mandate. At the meeting on 4 November in Washington, it was decided that MICIVIH would continue to give priority to the monitoring and promotion of respect for human rights in Haiti. As in the past, it would document the human rights situation, make recommendations to the Haitian authorities, implement an information and civic education programme and help to solve problems such as those relating to detentions, medical assistance to victims and the return of displaced persons. MICIVIH would observe the forthcoming electoral campaign, during which it would monitor respect for freedom of expression and association. It might participate in the observation of the election itself. MICIVIH would also contribute to institution-building, particularly the strengthening of human rights organizations.

In his 23 November 1994 report to the General Assembly on the situation of democracy and human rights in Haiti, the Secretary-General proposed that MICIVIH, while continuing to verify compliance with Haiti's human rights obligations and to promote respect for the rights of all Haitians, should contribute, in so far as possible, to the strengthening of democratic institutions. The broadening of the responsibilities of the Mission would not have any financial implications, for the total number of its staff would remain unchanged.


Originally, as authorized by Security Council resolution 867 (1993), UNMIH was to comprise 567 police monitors and a military construction unit with a strength of approximately 700, including 60 military trainers. Military personnel were to be provided by Argentina, Canada and the United States. Police personnel were to be contributed by Algeria, Austria, Canada, France, Indonesia, Madagascar, the Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia and Venezuela.

By its resolution 940 (1994), the Council expanded the mandate of UNMIH and its authorized troop level to 6,000. The Mission would also include 567 civilian police personnel and approximately 250 international civilian staff and 200 local staff.

UNMIH is headed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Haiti, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria). 2 Mr Brahimi replaced Mr. Dante Caputo who had served as the Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and OAS for Haiti from December 1992 to September 1994.

The advance team is led in the field by the Chief of Staff of UNMIH, Col. William Fulton. 3 As of 30 November 1994, military and civilian police personnel of the advance team were provided by the following countries: 4

Bangladesh 1
Djibouti  2
1 2
Guatemala  2
Ireland  2
New Zealand  4
United States 5 

Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. Troops include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, mov-con, staff, etc.


The rough cost to the United Nations of UNMIH in 1994 was approximately $5.3 million. The costs of the operation are met by the assessed contributions of United Nations Member States. The cost of the operation of the multinational force is borne by the participating Member States.

The budget for the expanded UNMIH, from the period 1 February 1995 through 31 December 1995, amounts to $272,966,400 gross.


Following the 1991 coup d'etat, the humanitarian situation in Haiti deteriorated in spite of the efforts of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations. In March 1993, the United Nations and OAS launched a consolidated appeal for a humanitarian plan of action designed to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of the Haitian people. The budget required for the implementation of this plan was estimated at $62.7 million, for the areas of health, nutrition, agriculture and education.

Donors, however, provided only $9.6 million in response to the 1993 humanitarian appeal. Throughout 1994, eight agencies working under the United Nations/OAS umbrella the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)/World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization drew on their core resources to fund the shortfall in donor response to the inter-agency appeal and continued humanitarian assistance programmes in Haiti, despite difficulties created by the de facto authorities and the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council. United Nations programmes operated under a United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator serving concurrently as Resident Representative of UNDP.

Working with over 150 Haitian, international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations agencies focused on maintaining health and hospital emergency services, distributing basic drugs and medical supplies, helping control transmissible diseases and maintaining the cold chain needed for vaccinations. Food relief was also critical. By the time of the arrival of the multinational force in the country, with United Nations help humanitarian agencies were distributing food to some 940,000 needy Haitians. United Nations agency efforts also sought to prevent the breakdown in farm production and income and to improve water supply and sanitation in areas subject to high public health risks.

Bilateral donors also continued to carry out significant humanitarian activities, directly and through NGOs, in 1994.

In its resolution 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, the Security Council terminated the suspension of the embargo on petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related materiel of all kinds imposed on Haiti by resolution 841 (1993). Within the strict framework of the provisions of the resolution providing for possible exemptions for essential humanitarian needs, the United Nations and OAS invited PAHO to assume responsibility for a fuel management plan to permit the continued functioning of humanitarian activities. This programme, which commenced in January 1994, was managed by a steering committee composed of representatives of the organizations of the United Nations system, donors, NGOs and members of the Government. By mid-September 1994, a total of 1.2 million gallons of diesel fuel and over 206,000 gallons of gasoline had been distributed under the fuel management plan to NGOs and agencies engaged in humanitarian operations.

In view of the uncertainty and potential for violence expected to accompany a military intervention in Haiti, United Nations agencies established a communications network among NGOs and public and private hospitals, made contingency plans for dealing with epidemics and built up decentralized stocks of medicines, health supplies, water supply equipment and food to the maximum degree possible.

In late September 1994, an advance team from the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs arrived in Haiti to strengthen the office of the Humanitarian Coordinator. The team provided liaison between the multinational force and the humanitarian assistance community in Haiti, and led an inter-agency effort to identify post-intervention humanitarian needs. On the basis of its consultations with bilateral donors, and international and Haitian NGOs, the United Nations, OAS and the Government of Haiti prepared an appeal to meet immediate humanitarian needs and to facilitate the transition to reconstruction and development in the country.


  1. On 30 January 1995, the Security Council adopted its resolution 975 (1995), in which the Council determined that a secure and stable environment, appropriate to the deployment of UNMIH, existed in Haiti. The Council authorized the Secretary-General to recruit and deploy military contingents, civilian police and other civilian personnel to allow UNMIH to assume its functions as established in resolutions 867 (1993) and 940 (1994). It also authorized him, working with the commander of the multinational force, to take the necessary steps in order for UNMIH to assume these responsibilities. According to resolution 975, the full tranfer of responsibility from the multinational force to UNMIH was to be completed by 31 March 1995. The Council also extended the mandate of UNMIH until 31 July 1995 and authorized the Secretary-General to deploy in Haiti, in accordance with resolution 940, up to 6,000 troops and, as recommended in his report to the Council of 17 January 1995, up to 900 civilian police officers. Return
  2. As of the beginning of February 1995, Mr. Brahimi has taken up residence in Haiti. Return
  3. On 12 January 1995, the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council agreed with his proposal to appoint Major-General Joseph Kinzer (United States) as Commander of the military component of UNMIH. Return
  4. As of 6 March 1995, the following countries were providing 149 civilian police personnel, 356 troops and 24 observers to UNMIH as follows:
    Algeria (5 civilian police)
    Bangladesh (11 troops; 4 observers)
    Canada (88 civilian police; 38 troops
    Djibouti (7 troops; 2 observers)
    France (36 civilian police; 2 observers)
    Guatemala (2 troops; 4 observers)
    Ireland (2 troops; 2 observers)
    Netherlands (67 troops)
    New Zealand (4 observers)
    Pakistan (17 troops; 4 observers)
    Togo (20 civilian police)
    Tunisia (2 observers)
    United States (212 troops)