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Sender: o-imap@webmap.missouri.edu
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 97 13:28:56 CST
From: rich%pencil@UKCC.uky.edu (Rich Winkel)
Subject: Turkey Contra-Guerrila State: Planning war against the people (1/2)
Article: 6005

Problems in the struggle against terrorism and proposals for solutions

From the National Security Council from Turkey, [19 February 1997]

The following internal strategy paper was translated by the Kurdistan Informationcentre Amsterdam.


Terrorism and the fight against terrorism has occupied the country’s agenda for a substantial period and great resources are expended in the struggle with terrorism. However, despite the widespread and effective manner of the security forces continuation of the struggle with terrorism, which needs to be waged all-out, it is observed that they are faced with a number of problems in the political, social and economic dimensions and that shortcomings and hitches have arisen in the solution of these problems. Since terrorist activities in our country are carried out on a broad platform it is considered that the struggle to be conducted in this field should also be carried out with multi-faceted organisation.

As well as the continuation of the struggle on a military dimension, a number of problems arise due to the requirements of security resources and the hitches in the activities of certain state institutions and establishments.


The importance must be stressed of prioritising meeting the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces, in order that this struggle be waged in an uninterrupted and effective manner. The problems faced in the Domestic Security Operation are listed below.


a. There has been an interruption in activities for the arrangement of the borders with Iraq, started between 1983-1989, due to the Gulf crisis.

b. The Physical Border Security System is inadequate.

c. The means of identification and determination of targets in the Physical Border Security System on the Iranian and Armenian borders are inadequate.

d. There is a need for helicopter pads in the region*, and the military units do not have any means of communication in the military station and military bass areas. (* the region is a euphemism for the Kurdish region within Turkey in particular, and the state of emergency region in particular (translator))

e. The projects of modernisation of the Turkish Armed Forces must be continued.


The necessary precautions to be taken in the matter of measures to be applied in order to deprive the PKK terrorist organisation of financial resources have been determined by joint activities of the relevant Ministries, Institutions and Establishments, co-ordinated by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council.

The Inter-Ministry PURSUANCE AND DIRECTION COMMITTEE was formed with a Prime Ministerial Directive dated 15 September 1994 with the aim of determining the necessary procedures, putting them into practice and continuously following up and co-ordinating their application in order to apply these measures.

Appointment of Ministries, Institutions and Establishments relevant to the matter was secured by the publication of two Prime Ministerial Circulars dated 14 March 1995 containing the legislative and administrative measures of terrorist organisations. The first meeting of the Pursuance and Direction Committee relating to the procedures conducted was held on 3 July 1995, and the second and last on 20 November 1996. There was a period of 18 months between the two meetings. If the committee had met every month, it could have been possible to secure more productive work and direction in the activities carried out. The conclusion was reached that although the procedures relating to the precautions taken were generally fulfilled, there were shortcomings and hitches in the matters of inter-institutional co-ordination and intelligence.


a. The co-ordination and Direction of Intelligence: The military units intelligence branches face difficulties in obtaining domestic security intelligence, the dimensions of which are far greater. There is no arrangement of activities or hierarchy between state intelligence organisations like MIT (National Intelligence Establishment), SECURITY and JITEM (Gendarme Intelligence Struggle with Terrorism). Intelligence obtained becomes delayed intelligence by reason of bureaucratic and hierarchic practices. Difficulties are experienced in the combination of intelligence and the intelligence organisations work independently of each other and without co-ordination.

b. The Temporary Village Guard System: The Temporary Village Guard System, which has been highly beneficial in the matter of achieving security and public order, is in the position of being a target of the PKK terrorist organisation. Problems with the activities and with rehabilitation in the Temporary Village Guard System, which is made up of people of the region, continue. There is a need for Temporary Village Guards in some areas. The Temporary Village Guards and the Voluntary Village Guards, who do the same job, do not benefit from the same rights. Law number 442, the Village Law, has not yet been enacted (sic).

c. Special Police Action Teams: The expected result has not been achieved form the Special Police Action Teams formed with the approval of the Ministry of the Interior on 15 April 1994 within the Provincial Security Directorates for employment in operations against armed terrorists in the hills, by reason of erroneous employment and bad practice. A large proportion of the personnel, who were suitable in the beginning from the point of view of physical condition, have lost their attributes with time die to lack of training and employment outside their actual duties. It has been determined in addition that they have been cause for breakdown of discipline by behaviour such as talking and making noise and lighting fires during night ambush duties, that they have been involved in harsh attitudes and behaviour against citizens (Offices of the Chief of General Staff, 22 November 1996).

d. Special Security Organisations in Public Institutions and Establishments: Units engaged in the protection of buildings and roads are unable to act according to the requirements of their actual duties. Law number 2495, the Law Regarding the Foundation of Special Security Organisations in Public Institutions and Establishments, has not yet proved functional.

e. Prisons and their Problems: Legal and administrative problems relating to the prisons continue. The prisons in their existing state virtually act as schools and training, organisation and communication centres for the organisations.

In addition, the Administration of the prisons has been divided into internal and external administration, and there is no certainty of collaboration between them. There are training and cultural weaknesses among prison officers. The percentage of wardens from the people of the region is over 80 %. There are insufficient female wardens for the numbers of problems such as the lack of modern equipment and apparatus, and errors in the design of prisons and the dormitory system.


It is inevitable that the waging of the struggle against terrorism by the effective use of security forces will also be supported by elements of a number of national forces. Just as the intervention of these elements may meet, albeit to a limited degree, the reasons for the rise of terrorism, they ill also secure new local structures. Terrorist movements starting with the appearance of trying to obtain political, social and cultural rights gain strength by the exploitation of backwardness form the cultural, economic and social point of view as well as of the geographical conditions of the region, and the part of this strength relating to armed action groups is broken by the effective struggle of the security forces. However, along with this first dimension of the struggle with terrorism, that of the removal of support secured for terrorism and the conditions for this support, conducted by security forces, it is also possible to realise the its second dimension:

a. In the field of politics:

Provision for the organisation of militants domestically is secured by means of HADEP (People’s Democracy Party). The voting potential for HADEP in the last elections was noteworthy. This legal party is virtually in a position of recruiting soldiers. The activities of this party, particularly in Diyarbakir, have become clear from the statements of terrorists seized wounded or uninjured in operations conducted in the region, and complaints have been filed with the necessary offices (Offices of the Chief of General Staff, 22 November 1996). Certain human rights associations and other associations with a legal appearance are also evaluated to have an attitude other than impartial. People carrying out certain activities (within these) as organisation sympathisers later join terrorist organisations through these associations. In addition, there are two types of countries which afford support to terrorism. One type is made up of counties like Greece, which give support to terrorism and the organisation and use it as politics against Turkey, and the other, like Germany, France and the UK, are those which do not evaluate the terrorist incidents in our country in a political manner, but see them (sic) as unfortunate local people. It is deemed important to explain the damage the terrorist organisations in our country do to the European Community (drugs and arms smuggling etc.). Terrorist organisations also used against the state the reactions against the existing regime of unemployed, troubled young people unable from a social point of view to adjust to the environment in large centres of population. It is necessary to educate young people along the lines that they are under the guarantee of the state, by aiming at education and activities and the realisation of their potentials within the circles in which they live.

b. In the field of administration: ..

c. It is not possible to transfer all the resources of the state to the backward regions. Otherwise the working of the machinery which secures the balance of development may falter. The state should direct its incitements and investments by planning along the lines of the geographical structure and natural sources of the region. And while taking investments and incitements to the region, it is necessary to take into account a number of shortcomings arising from the geographical and climatic conditions as well as balancing elements, and to consider as a whole the policies which will direct the people of the region towards production, meet their education, health and housing needs and tie the people to their land and their regions.

The principle must be understood that it is the people of the region who have the capacity for production and that it is also the people of the region who will be able to develop the region. When payments relating to investment programmes planned for the region are made, they must be properly designated and the fortification of the local administrations must be taken into account on points such as initiatives of metropolitan infrastructure, health, environment and economics. In this manner the participation of the people of the region in decisions relating to their own welfare and an increase of political awareness may be secured. The economic depression in the traditional economic activity of the region, animal husbandry, has made itself obvious as a result of the livestock sector being unable to keep up with competition in the country and of its subsequent collapse. Terrorism and the struggle with terrorism have dealt blows on this sector. There have been migrations and a breakdown in the pastoral system as a result of panic caused by terrorism. A pilot region to be determined and state supported regions should be dealt with as a whole. It is not possible to support the many provinces in the region to the same degree.

(1) Population Planning:..

(2) Investment in Education:

There are important weaknesses in the number of schools which are closed and the amount of teachers working in the region. Of around 14.000 schools, 5.000, 1s 36%, are closed. Out of 53.000 teachers, there is a shortage of 17.000, is 40% of teachers. In addition, 43% of the numbers of teachers are people of the region. With the aim of removing this shortage, 63 reserve officers and 76 NCOs, a total of 139 military personnel, have been assigned by the 2nd and 3rd army commands as teachers in schools without teachers. It is a known fact that a large majority of participation in terrorist organisations comes from sections of society with a low level of education.

(3) Investment in Health:

Health services are not at an adequate or desirable level. There are things which effect citizens negatively, such as the lack of doctors, midwives and health personnel in general, the shortage of killed personnel, the price of drugs and the shortcomings in the application of the green card system*. (*The green card system was a system whereby people living below the poverty line were issued with green cards which were supposed to facilitate their entry into health facilities.)

(4) Investment in Employment:

There are important investments, starting in recent years and still continuing, which will create broad work opportunities in the fields of agriculture, livestock and industry in the region. It is necessary to complete these investments and bring them to a state of being establishments which will create employment. Initiatives to secure that as well as protection and observation from state forces of the investments and establishments, the people of the region protect and observe and take these establishments, which will create fields of employment, in hand. People should not be expected to stand up for something to which they make no contribution. If the state prepares everything and places it before these people, this serves no purpose other than to waste resources and to encourage the people of the region to sloth. It is possible to get the people to stand up for and protect these establishments by encouraging them to work and creating the necessary positive atmosphere, educating them and giving them the opportunity to expend labour in the establishments in their own region.

(5) Investment in Infrastructure:

The existing roads in the region are inadequate. Transport is restricted to the main roads. Travel opportunities are thoroughly reduced, especially in bad weather conditions, and the means of transport of large numbers of villages and hamlets are completely cut off. This situation hinders and delays the timely intervention of security forces in the face of probable terrorist actions. In addition, Yuksekova runway, from which 32 sorties were effected in 1995, is no longer in its current condition, suitable for planes to land and take off.

d. In the Psycho-Social Field:

The biggest influence deemed important form the point of view of psycho-social power is national unity. The achievement of national unity requires that people think and act together. The state should take urgent measures to secure this togetherness and create an atmosphere of trust.

External forces desirous of weakening the Republic of Turkey, rendering it dependent on themselves or causing its collapse and their collaborationists inside of internal of external forces desirous of drawing the state to systems and ideologies outside the raison-d etne of the state are primarily working to direct the public onto their side and influence the psycho-social and cultural force. Activities which display their influence in the East and Southeast turn into psychological pressure with the influence of armed terrorism, and the lack of knowledge and awareness of the people of the region of the genuine community values belonging to the essence of the state broaden the exploitable fields for the terrorist organisations and facilitate them.

This force, which is at least as important in the struggle with terrorism as armed force, and possibly more so, has so far been conducted though the limited means of the Turkish Armed Forces with great sacrifice. But in order to achieve the desired results, psychological operations and propaganda should be run by all state institutions and establishments in an organised, co-ordinated and planned manner. The state has not conducted adequate activities or contributed enough to this since 1984.

(1) Media Activities:

The most important aim of the terrorist organisation is to remain on the agenda. The tactics and strategies of the media generally support this aim of the organisation, which does not even hesitate to use its people in suicide-type actions in order to achieve this. By these practices it is knowingly or unknowingly being used as a tool by the organisation, and even making a contribution to it.

(2) NGO (International Aid Organisations) Activities:

Large numbers of delegations come to the region with human rights as an excuse, these delegations meet previously specified people and draw up reports. These reports are later used internally and externally as means of propaganda against the state. Another aspect of this business is that these reports are evaluated as if they were the reports of parliamentary delegations and/or various international organisations. The damaging activities of non-governmental aid organisations (NGO), which carry out activities to our detriment in N. Iraq almost like missionaries are another aspect of this matter.

(3) Activities in the creation of public opinion:..


a. Conclusion:

Terrorist organisations, and in particular the PKK terrorist organisation, carry out destructive activities targeting the basic qualities of our country for the sake of their aims and cherishing the objective of wearing down the Republic of Turkey. It is not deemed possible to run the struggle against these organisations with state security forces alone. The struggle with terrorism will only be able to achieve success as the result of the joint struggle of all state institutions and establishments and the Turkish nation as a whole. For this reason the struggle with terrorism must be dealt with as a state problem. Governments may change in Turkey, but the strategy for the struggle with terrorism should not change from one government to another. To this end, the state should formulate a struggle with terrorism policy and it should be applied without leave for the slightest deviation. A state minister and headquarters to be assigned with this in mind should be based on the region, and their activities directed from here.

b. Proposals for Solutions:

(1) In relation to the Requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces Domestic Security Operation:

(a) The activities for the arrangement of the borders with Iraq, started between 1983-1989, and interrupted due to the Gulf crisis, should be restarted, and the necessary Border Arrangements be made for the controls of the common border, which passes through severely rough and restrictive land, to be placed in the more easily controllable sections of land, in a manner beneficial to both sides. Subsequent to this, it is imperative that the Physical Border Security System be set up, and an asphalt road should be completed.

(b) The means of identification and determination of targets in the physical border security system on the Iranian and Armenia borders should be reinforced with rubber-tyred armoured vehicles, observation apparatus and lighting equipment.

(c) 44 helicopter pads for which there is a need in the region should be constructed.

(d) The need of military station and military base areas whose military units do not have any means of communication for telephones, mobile telephones and car phones, should be met.

(e) The modernisation projects of the Turkish Armed Forces should be continued.

(f) The vehicles and equipment presented in APPENDIX A. ADDENDUM 1, in particular those for target identification and determination, should be procured.

(g) The necessary payment should be designated for reconstruction of around 600 km of used by the security forces in a total of around 3.200 km of route as explained in APPENDIX A, ADDENDUM 2.

(h) The maintenance and repair of about 1500 km of road should be conducted, APPENDIX A, ADDENDUM 2.

(i) 1200 km of road be asphalted according to a plan with the aim of preventing the terrorists from easily laying mines, APPENDIX A, ADDENDUM 2.

(j) The necessary payment should be designated for construction of a road bridge and 15 km of approach road with the aim of opening a second customs point in the Silopi region.

(k) The appropriate sum should be set aside for the construction of a 3 km runway to respond to the existing needs of military planes on the 15 km road in question, and 15 billion TL resources should be designated for the General Roads Directorate for this purpose.

(2) In Relation to Activities to Dry Up the Financial Resources of the Terrorist Organisations(s):

(a) In order for the Pursuance and Direction Committee to be able to work effectively, follow developments and if necessary, direct, it should meet every month.

(b) Among the activities of the Pursuance and Direction Committee, decisiveness should be achieved in particular in dealing with the Mafia who secure great finances for the terrorist organisations with their illegal activities at home and abroad and are in the positions of being a focus point of black money.

(3) In Relation to Co-ordination and Direction of Intelligence between the Ministries, Institutions and Establishments:

(a) It is imperative that the intelligence sector, which has reached the state of being a means of making money in the region by reason of the independent and uncoordinated manner of working of the intelligence organisations, be unified at one centre. For the success of the domestic security operation, which must be constructed upon correct, constant, timely and effective intelligence starting from this point, intelligence elements of MIT and Security Organisations should be instructed by circular to participation in meetings and activities at intelligence co-ordination centres formed on the level of provincial bases and security commands.

(b) The payment designated to these intelligence organisations for the struggle with terrorism should be spent on the co-ordination of this centre.

(c) Following this construction, the strategic intelligence of the state should, as in other countries, concentrate on the removal of high level director cadres of the terrorist organisation/

(d) It is deemed imperative that a protection office be created within the framework of MIT with the aim of safeguarding and protection of local agents (including confessors) to secure the continual flow of intelligence, that all precautions necessary be taken within a protection programme and that the state make its strength felt.

(4) In Relation to the Temporary Village Guard System: (a) This establishment, which has produced successful results in the struggle with terrorism should be continued even if the State of Emergency is lifted.

(b) Additional GKK (Temporary Village Guard) members should be created in areas there is a need, and adjustments made between regions (APPENDIX B).

(c) Voluntary Village Guards, who struggle in the same manner as GKKs should benefit from compensation in cases when they fall as martyr or are injured.

(d) Temporary village guards and their families should benefit from health and retirement rights.

(e) The legal arrangements covering the above points in Law Number 442, the Village Law, should be secured.

(5) In Relation to the Special Police Action Teams:

(a) As a general principle, their action orders should be given by security commanderships in order that all special police action teams may be effectively used in operations.

(b) They should be subject to refresher courses by military units according to a plan, and they should be raised to the position demanded by their physical conditions.

(c) The special police actions teams should be employed according to the requirements of Law Number 3152 and used in road security placements.

(d) In the matter of public relations, activities should be initiated to ascertain that they are subject to training and that they participate in psychological operations conducted to win over the people.

(6) In Relation to the Creation by Public Institutions and Foundations of Special Security Establishments:

(a) Special Security Units should be set up by the relevant institutions and the weaknesses in the matter of the continuing shortage of firearms in certain security units already formed should be removed.

(b) Military units engaged in the security of buildings and roads should be removed from this job and it should be ensured that institutions and establishments set up Special Security Organisations according to the requirements of law number 2495, with the aim of increasing operational force.

(7) In Relation to Prisons and their Problems:

(a) The hitches in the prisons should be removed and the joint leadership in the administration created by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior should be abolished.

(b) There should be progress towards a cell system.

(c) Political remand prisoners and criminal remand prisoners should not be held under one roof, even those taking advantage of the remorse law.

(d) Those guilty of terrorist offences in closed prisons should not be allowed open visits.

(e) Those taking advantage of the remorse law should be brought onto the confessors protection programme.

(f) Directors expert in the matter of terrorism should work in prisons where those guilty of terrorism are held and psychological operations should be conducted against remand prisoners and convicts.

(g) The prisons being built for terrorist offenders should be finished as soon as possible and the necessary supplementary payment should be designated to this end.

(h) The construction of Special Prisons to European standards for terrorist offenders should be started without delay.

(i) Prisons in city centres should be pulled outside the cities, existing prisons should be reformed and the X-RAY system should be set up in all prisons.

(j) All employees in the prisons form representative prosecutors to wardens should be checked and any lack in training redressed.

(k) Health workers in the prisons should be strengthened, the number of teachers should be increased cultural programmes directed at reform should be organised and treatment should be increased.

(l) The sentence execution system should be rearranged in a manner genuinely aiming at the reform of the convicts.

(m) A judicial police establishment should be set up both in order that inquiries be conducted with speed and efficiency and that the external protection of the prisons and transfer of prisoners may be carried out with complete guarantees.

(n) The geographical and communication situations and the quantities and qualities of offences committed in these places should be noted and re-specified in a manner to secure opportunities so that the situations of provinces failing into the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, where terrorist offenders are tried, become more secure, and trial becomes more secure and regular.

(o) From the point of view of public order, security and the speed of trial, it should be ensured that the promises of State Security Courts be built in places near to the prisons.

(8) In relation to the Economic and Social Problems of the Region:

(a) In the Political Field:

(I) HADEP should be kept under surveillance and control with the aim of passifying its activities.

(II) The necessary measures should be taken to cut off HADEP’s foreign relations.

(III) Overt and covert and persistent pressure should be placed on HADEP by means of the state , civilian community organisations and universities, and it should be dropped from the agenda.

(IV) Atrush camp, a source of militants for the organisation abroad, should be evacuated.

(V) The resources in foreign countries giving support to terrorism, in particular Greece, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, the Russian Federation, Iran and European countries, should be dried up.

(VI) At home, the gathering and organisation of groups supporting the organisation in the ghettos of large centres of population like Istanbul, Izmir, Manisa, Adana and Mersin should be prevented.

(VII) The fact that the associations which support HADEP have taken sides is their greatest weakness. This weakness should be used and they should be dropped form the agenda by the use of public opinion.

(VIII) The drugs and weapons smuggling activities of the PKK terrorist organisation and HADEP, which has the appearance of being its legal extension, should frequently be processed from the point of view of the damage it does to European countries and domestic and foreign public opinion should be created in this matter.

(b) In the Field of Administration:

(I) People to be appointed to the region should be patriots, attached to the state, informed and experienced.

(II) The employment of people from the region should be kept at an acceptable level.

(III) Personnel appointed to the region should work there for substantial periods, mix with the local people and win their hearts through service.

(IV) The retirement of people, in particular administration personnel, appointed to the region, should be suspended for a minimum of two years.

(V) It is imperative that people with a chance of success or promotion be given the opportunity to serve in the region , and their success should be tested in the region.

(VI) People to be employed in the region should be cleansed of political influence and pressure.

(VII) Personnel working for public institutions and establishments in the region but who harm to the struggle with terrorism should be ejected from the region.

(VIII) Administrators and public servants to be employed in the region should be selected from among authoritative and experienced people, the image that the East and the Southeast are places of internal exile should be erased and it should be ensured that meticulous measures are taken with this aim.

(c) In the Field of Economics:

(I) Attractive centres with a high potential for development should be specified, these centres should be speedily developed with intense state assistance and thus acceptance of responsibility for the motor of the economic development of these centres and the region around should be ensured.

(II) All investments including private sector investments should be directed to this region, the state should take on the investment into the infrastructure, and private sector investment should be built upon this.

(III) The development of the region should be planned, the plan should concentrate on certain places and activities be defined by it.

(IV) Apart from state supported assistance, the private sector should be encouraged to invest in the region with tax exemptions and other incentives.

(V) The education, health, housing and transport problems of the region should be solved concurrently with the struggle with terrorism.

(VI) Unemployment should be restrained and employment opportunities increased.

(VII) The soup kitchens being run in some provincial capitals in the region should be extended to the district capitals and other towns.

(VIII) Priority should be given to providing state-supporting villagers with electricity, roads, water, telephones and other services.

(IX) The application of unemployment welfare should be started in the region.

(X) Citizens suffering damages as a result of terrorism should be compensated.

(XI) Industrial foundations based on agriculture should be set up, animal husbandry should be encouraged and reorganised, organised industrial regions should be formed and emphasis must be placed on the construction of housing, schools and hospitals.

(XII) Animal husbandry should be re-established in places where terrorism has no influence and a labour-intensive livestock system should be developed appropriate to the conditions of the region.

(XIII) Along with the South East Anatolian Project (GAP), a Regional and Subregional Development Plan co-ordinated and integrated with the whole region and all sectors should be drawn up and put into practice.

(XIV) By reason of the serious depletion in the stocks of the Turkish Armed Forces in the struggle, which has so far been waged by stretching the resources and stocks of the Turkish Armed Forces alone, and the negative experiences from the running of other projects, the payment designated to the struggle with terrorism from the national budget should be spent with the co-ordination of the offices of the Chief of General Staff.

(XV) The payment designated to the Turkish Armed Forces from the general budget should be increased and an additional payment designated.

(XVI) It should be ensured that the payment designated to the General Gendarme Command, which carries out the duties of the police in many districts where the security establishment has not been set up, be increased.

(1) In Relation to Activities in Population Planning:

(a) A census should be conducted now as the basis for investments for problems likely to arise.

(b) A population planning campaign should be started under the co-ordination of the Ministry of Health.

(c) The local people should be informed through education.

(d) It should be ensured that radical measures be taken such as bonuses for few children and taxes for many children.

(2) In Relation to Investment in Education:

(a) An education campaign should be announced, and special measures taken for the education and teaching of in particular women and children who do not know Turkish.

(b) The construction of boarding schools in district capitals, other towns and subdistricts should be accelerated, education conducted centrally and thus the safety of teachers secured.

(c) The people should be made to adopt the struggle by methods such as the inclusion of the Struggle with Terrorism subject within the scope of national security lessons and compulsory study at universities across the whole country.

(d) Special measures should be put into practice and measures be taken in the matter of private education in order to deal with the lack of teachers.

(e) Teachers to be appointed to the region should be selected from among those who wish to serve in the region and subjected to detailed orientation training in the matter of the struggle with terrorism.

(f) Higher wages should be paid to teachers appointed to the region.

(g) Activities should be started aimed at incentives like holidays and seminars for teachers working in the region.

(h) Since 90% of the imams working in the region are local people, it should be ensured by the Ministry for Religious Affairs that men of religion with the same qualifications be appointed from outside the region.

(3) In Relation to Investment in Health:

A mass health check-up should be conducted and a health campaign started by the Ministry of Health, and plans should be made for contributions of the Red Crescent and similar institutions (The Red Crescent should assist in the region as much as they did in N.Iraq). A subregion health policy aimed at the State of Emergency Region should be specified in the framework of the national health policy, available drugs should be determined, and the infrastructure of health institutions, consultants and support personnel, equipment and apparatus in the region should be made adequate and sufficient, the practice of mobile health teams should be continued and the second 7-years health plan directed at the 23 provinces in the Southeast Anatolia region* should be followed up and applied with sensitivity.

(* Exact details unknown to translator, but know to be a plan concerning population control in the specified (predominantly Kurdish) provinces). The importance from the point of view of the region of family planning and mother and child health services should be taken into account, these services should be reinforced along the lines of the BUKK*(2) decisions and the Prime Ministerial Circulars, importance should be placed on their extension within the region and it should be ensured that this matter is accepted and applied as a permanent state policy.

*(2) The full form of the acronym is unknown to the translator, research continues and an amended version of this translation will be produced when appropriate).

(4) In Relation to Investments in Employment:

(a) Employment investments to be made in the region should be selected from labour-intensive investments.

(b) At the same time, these investments should be investments with a high capacity for employing unskilled workers.

(c) It should be ensured that preference is given to investments to be made in fields such as housing, forestry and mining, evaluating the resources of the region.

(5) In Relation to Investments in the Infrastructure:

(a) In order for the development steps to be initiated against the increase of population in the region to be successful, the State Planning Department, the Development Bank and the Provinces Bank should conduct feasibility studies and the establishment of the infrastructure should be completed according to a plan.

(b) Care should be taken that competitive tenders for investment in the region should not be granted to contractors sympathetic to the organisation.

(c) Those migrating form evacuated villages and hamlets and scattered centres of population should be combined and the Koy-Kent (Village-City*) projects put into practice. (* The Koy-Kent or Village-cities project is the resettlement of people from evacuated villages and hamlets in centralised new tons closer to the cities, justified by reason of security.) In order to encourage this, people should be convinced that all kinds of services, like roads, education, security and health will be provided by the state in the Village-Cities to be set up.

(d) Because of the negative influence of the land problems in the infrastructure in the OHAL region on the struggle with terrorism, it should be ensured that cadastral activities in this region are completed.

d. In Relation to the Psycho-Social Situation of the Region:

(1) Media Activities:

(a) The publication of general or local press supporting the organisation and broadcasts of TV and radio channels praising the organisation, and in particular MED TV, should be obstructed by the state.

(b) The opportunities and attractions of watching television and listening to radio broadcasts in the region should be increased.

(c) Broadcasts like MED TV which support the organisation should be suppressed and interfered with by the use of technological equipment.

(d) Bearing in mind the effect it has on the people it should be ensured that the media is used, and effectively, along the lines of our own aims.

(e) In order to bring an end to the confusion of audio and visual broadcasting in the country, the National Frequency Plan should be put into immediate practice, taking into account the existing situation in the realities of the country.

(f) Administrative and technical measures to be taken against illegal destructive and separatist electromagnetic broadcast should be determined and it should be ensured that they are put into practice.

(2) On NGO Activities:

(a) The activities of non-government institutions (NGO), who carry out activities against the state in matter of Human Rights, should be closely monitored and obstructed.

(b) The activities of the Human Rights Enquiries lower and higher committees, set up in order to render the accusations directed at this country in the matter of Human Rights ineffectual and to clarify the necessary corrective measures, should be continued in a more effective manner.

(c) Units should be formed in institutions relating to Human Rights and an active co-ordination should be set up between these institutions and establishments.

(d) It should be ensured that legal arrangements appropriate to the European Convention on Human Rights be set up without delay.

(3) On Activities of Shaping Public Opinion:

(a) A psychological action group should be set up within the framework of each state ministry, organisation should be conducted in the region and psychological action should be taken on a systematic basis.

(b) Programmes directed at the securance of national and moral values and unity and wholeness should be rearranged in all the schools.

(c) The media should be used and the people given anti-terrorist information.

(d) Public institutions and establishments and civil service chiefs should be held responsible in the first degree for the psychological operation.

(e) Conferences, small business institutions and discussion meeting in cafes should be organised by civil service chiefs, teachers and religious officers.

(f) The application of KOY*, which has had an important effect on the people, should be run under the co-ordination of civil service chiefs. (* The full form of the acronym is unknown to the translator, research continues and an amended version of this translation will be produces when appropriate)

(g) Experts who will act as advisors in public relations should be appointed to the civil service chiefs.

(h) The psychological operation should take women and children into account primarily as its target group.

(i) The psychological operation should be run by the Ministry of Culture as priority business of the state.

(j) Delegations coming should be very well evaluated and those delegations supporting the organisation or of whom there are suspicions or false companies and institutions should be obstructed.

(k) Tours should be arranged of the region for parliamentarians and high level authorities.

(l) All possible political measures should be taken against the attempts to have the state tried under the concepts of human rights and democracy because of our international obligations.

(m) It should be ensured that tours of and visits to the region, other than for investment, service or duty, be kept to a minimum.

e. Legal Arrangements Felt to be Needed and Other Matters:

(a) The bill of law securing opportunities for the gendarmes to conduct intelligence activities against threats directed from home and abroad should be enacted.

(b) The existence of small centres of population on the borders or in the near vicinity facilitate the passage of terrorists across borders and the provision of logistic support by means of collaborationists in these centres. For this reason, a border strip should be evacuated and buffer zones formed, and following the evacuation of a 5-10 km strip in this manner, it should be announced as a dangerous and prohibited region.

(c) Legal limitations should be introduced for the provision of guns to personnel other than special security officers and soldiers and the police, other than hunting rifles carried by hunters for sport (except pump action rifles).

(d) Permission should only be granted to retired security personnel to carry and be in possession of firearms, their sale and transfer should be prohibited and the firearms should be placed in the treasury as income in the case of the decease of the security officers.

(e) The penalties for gun smuggling in the Turkish Penal Code should be brought up to deterrent level.

(f) The rewards given to those informing about unlicensed firearms should be increased in order to seize and determine unlicensed, illegal firearms.

(g) The connections in organised gun running occurring in Turkey often go as far as politicians and arms smugglers are taking advantage of the immunity of parliamentarians in return for various interests. For this reason, the law of parliamentary immunity should be rearranged so that offences committed by parliamentarians outside the Assembly remain outside the scope of immunity.

(h) On condition that the membership of the Mehmetcik Foundation* and the Turkish Armed Forces Reinforcement Foundation should be set up for gendarmerie under the name of Public Order Foundation by creating new resources, separate from the resources of these foundations, or else the name of the police foundation should be changed to Public Order Foundation and the foundation made into a joint police and gendarme foundation. (*The Mehmetcik Foundation is a foundation which supports and collects donations from the public for the Turkish Army)

(i) It should be ensured that the upper limit for compensation for the operation indicated at paragraph A of article 28 of Decree Number 375 in the Rule of Law be lifted.

(2) In Relation to Other Matters:

(a) There are districts in the State of Emergency, neighbouring and sensitive provinces where there is no police establishment. Security and public order in the town centres in these districts are ensured by gendarme members. Gendarme units concentrating on town centres are unable to prioritise their operational activities in the hills. Police establishments should be set up in the towns which do not have them and the influence of the state should be established.

(b) It should be ensured that the Prime Ministerial State of Emergency Coordination Committee carry out effective activities.

(c) Activities directed at controlling the migration movement should be continued with the aim of obstructing the PKK terrorist organisation taking advantage of the migration movements by activities of taking shelter, forming bases, training, preparing for actions and securing logistic support.

(d) Lower and higher committees should immediately be set up the struggle with drugs and the functionality of these committees should be ensured.

(e) Activities in the matter of the prevention of the hijacking of transport vehicles should be accelerated.

(f) With the aim of preventing the PKK holing up in Northern Iraq and ensuring that their hit and run attacks directed at Turkey are rendered ineffective, cross-border operations should be conducted by our Armed Forces through the initiative of the Offices of the Chief of General Staff on the Iraq side of the Turkey-Iraq border in the settled region by the name of the Green Line. The operations in question, which will be conducted against the territory of Northern Iraq outside the Green Line should be continued with the approval of the government and the co-ordination of the civil service offices.

(g) The activities being carried out to fill the power vacuum in Northern Iraq within the framework of the territorial integrity of Iraq should be continued more actively.

(h) It should be ensured that a central unit is set up to provide opportunities for more effective help to be given to Turkish citizens living abroad with their problems and for better organisation and direction along the lines of our national interests.

(i) There should be settlement of the people form vacated and evacuated villages and hamlets in settlement regions to be formed in attractive centres to be created in the region.

(j) Importance should be placed at border points such as Habur and Dil Ucu at Nahcivan, on border trade which will rejuvenate trade in the region, the necessary arrangements should be made at these points and a part of the income to be secured from here should be turned into service for the local people.

(k) A series of dams should be built, following a study of the subsidiaries of the Hezil, Habur, Zap and Semdinli rivers, in appropriate places in a manner to present a physical obstruction, which the aim of increasing security on the Iraqi border.

(l) Southeast and Eastern Anatolia and the region of N. Iraq adjoining to our borders are tribal land by their nature. The tribes in question play an important role in drawing people to the side of the state and winning over the local people. The necessary warmth and assistance should be displayed to the tribes.

(m) The fact that the press prosecution, which is the decision-making (sic) body in the struggle with damaging publications, is based in Istanbul, is a cause of delay. For this reason, a press prosecution should also be created in Diyarbakir.

(n) Modern, meticulous and co-ordinated measures should be taken at all customs points, especially the Gurbulak border point through which entry is effected form Iran, directed at the prevention of the entry of arms and drugs.

(o) The proposed measures should be transferred to the field of practice in order to prevent passage by illegal methods through the borders (including the coasts) and the border points.

(o) In connection with this, all possible support should be afforded to the trial bodies, and the trial procedures should display at least as much sensitivity to the struggle with terrorism as the security forces.

(p) The Turkish Armed Forces should continue to benefit from the practice of reduced fares with Turkish Airlines even in the case that the State of Emergency is lifted.

(r) The pensions of martyrs and veterans should be increased.

(s) The families of martyrs should be housed and the children of martyrs given the right to enter university without passing the university entrance examinations.

(t) It should be ensured that the mothers and fathers of martyrs receive pensions without being subject to the 85 year age limit.



(Military Requirements, ADDENDUM 1, Means and Equipment of Target Determination/ Identification, ADDENDUM 2, Plans for Roads to be Constructed and Maintained, New Road Construction and the Need to increase Capacity)


(The Education, Teaching and Health Situation, The GKK Teams and their Current Situation, Vacated Villages and Hamlets)