Date: Tue, 2 Jun 1998 22:12:53 -0400
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From: Benny Widyono <benny.widyono@WORLDNET.ATT.NET>
Subject: Re: article from www.huaren.org
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An Analysis of the Implication of Suharto's resignation for Chinese
By M. Ocorandi, Worldwide HuaRen Peace Mission, 28 May 1998
Suharto's sudden resignation gives us time to pause and assess what is
in for the future. The resignation is seen as only the beginning of a process
of change in Indonesia which will influence the position of Chinese
Indonesians, the majority of which will continue to stay in Indonesia, their
In the first 2 months of this year, Chinese Indonesians shopkeepers in
about forty small towns and hamlets were target of violent riots. Then
followed daily student demonstrations directed against Suharto. These
students demand political and economic reforms and are not against Chinese
Indonesians. At numerous occasions, the students made the emphatic statement
that they do not loot, burn, nor persecute the Indonesian Chinese.
However, in the first week of May student demonstrations in Medan, North
Sumatra, degenerated into mob violence against Chinese Indonesians, when the
government announced massive hikes of electricity and gasoline rates in
compliance with IMF's conditions for aid. A week later, it was Jakarta,
which was turned into an inferno by angry mobs. A three days looting and
burning followed the murder of six students at Trisakti university on May
the 12th by snipers, till date identity still unknown although suspicions
point in the direction of security forces.
About 500 people died, mostly looters who were trapped in shopping malls
set ablaze by arsonists. The death toll includes un unknown number but at
least some 20 Chinese Indonesians who tried to hide in their shops or were
locked in by angry mobs who set the shops on fire. The riots spread to
cities like Solo, Palembang, Tangerang and several other major cities.
Chinese Indonesians who could afford it fled the country. The less
fortunate: shopkeepers, street vendors selling fruit, vegetable, food etc.
in Glodok, Jatinegara and elsewhere, lost everything they had. They cried
and shook their heads, unable to make sense of the vicious racist attacks.
Government sources estimated that more than 3,000 buildings, including
Chinese Indonesian owned stores, homes and shopping malls, 959 cars and 500
motorcycles were destroyed or damaged during the insane rampage. Indonesia's
Antara news agency put the damage at an estimated $1 billion.
Who was orchestrating these anti Chinese Indonesian riots?
There are similarities and differences between the first and second wave
of riots. In both waves the target of violence has been Chinese Indonesian
owned shops, homes and businesses. The difference though is, the first wave
seemed to be perpetrated by desperate rural poor. The second wave, in Medan,
Jakarta and other major towns, seemed to be the work of urban poor. This
group has swollen as a direct consequence of massive layoffs caused by the
country's financial crisis. This crisis is caused by the collapse of the
rupiah, when its rate to the dollar went from Rp. 2,500 in early July 1997
to about Rp. 10,000 today.
Both waves of riots appeared at first glance to be spontaneous. But plenty
of evidence suggest that both waves were very well organized. The first
wave, the Food Riots, was preceded by frenzied verbal attacks by Indonesian
officials. These officials publicly condemned Chinese Indonesians as "rats'
and "traitors" who have committed "crimes" by "hoarding basic food
supplies". Neither these officials, nor anyone else from the Indonesian
government provided any evidence of such vicious racism, let alone educating
the public that the sudden increase of prices for food and other essentials
was directly related to the South East Asian crisis, and is not the fault of
small retailers. These scapegoating tactics were obviously meant to divert
anger away from the government in the wake of the rupiah's collapse. (See
Michael Ocorandi, An Anatomy of the Recent Anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia,
March 30, 1998, )
Regular Muslim religious sermons on Fridays, the prayer day of the week,
were used as forums by Indonesian officials to attack the Chinese
Indonesians. In late January 1998, after a Friday' prayer at Taman Sunda
Kelapa Mosque, General Syarwan Hamid spoke of 'eradication of rats' who are
not patriotic and at times of crisis "are salting away the fruits of our
national development". Obviously he was referring to the Chinese
Indonesians. This man has now become the new interior minister, courtesy of
Habibie, the new president! Other speakers at the rally also condemned
Chinese Indonesians: Adi Sasono, last week appointed as Minister of
Cooperatives by Habibie, Sri Eddy Swasono and Achmad Tirtosudiro. To quote
Habibie on May 27, 1998, as the new president he commits himself to the
rebuilding of an Indonesia that is 'free from racism' during a visit to
Jakarta’s burnt out Chinatown. It remains to be seen whether this
strong message is heeded by his newly appointed racist ministers and other
well known racists.
On January 23, 1998, Lt. General Prabowo Sugianto, the son in law of
President Suharto, held another such hate-rally in the guise of a religio=
us meet. As is custom, during the fasting month, the Muslims every evening
break their fast with a ceremony called Buka Puasa (Breaking the Fast.) On
that day, in front of the five thousand Muslim leaders attending the
ceremony, Prabowo blamed a 'political conspiracy' for the Indonesian
financial crisis. He urged his fellow officers and Muslim leaders to "close
ranks" in facing the challenges ahead. The challenges ahead were not
identified but other speakers explicitly linked the conspirators to the
"conglomerate group" and "their henchmen operating overseas.", two phrases
which were clear references to the Chinese Indonesians. Topping this vicious
racism, copies of "Lord of the Rim", a directory of Chinese owned businesses
in Asia, were distributed.
One big unresolved question is the shooting of six innocent students on
the campus of Trisakti University. General Wiranto categorically denied that
the armed forces under his command killed these students. He insists that
police and soldiers were only issued rubber bullets. Evidence shows the
shootings were done by sharpshooters, using real bullets from the top of a
superhighway that passes through the campus. It appears that separate units
in the armed forces, unbeknown to Wiranto, could be responsible for these
killing. A preliminary investigation point the finger at police forces.
Could the same units also be responsible for the disappearances and torture
of student activists? And why on earth would anyone want to risk such a
major crisis against a background already highly volatile caused by sudden
skyrocketing prices, massive layoffs, and hundreds of thousands of students
demonstrating all over the country? Was it deliberately done to provoke an
upheaval? If so, who could be the sinister mastermind?
The student demonstrations started as early as mid December 1997 and was
growing in size day by day. They have been from the start pro democracy, pro
reforms and are not directed against any ethnic group. Reminiscent of 1965,
Christian students, including many Chinese Indonesians, and Muslim students
demonstrated daily against the regime. If it weren't for the determination
of these young students in their early 20's, it would have been much harder
to get Suharto to resign!
Trisakti University, on whose campus the students' murder occured, was
founded by BAPERKI, an organization of Chinese Indonesians during Sukarno
times in respond to the discriminatory admission policy by Indonesian
prestigious state universities. During the 1965 anti communist riots which
brought Suharto to power, Trisakti was burned down and BAPERKI banned. Over
the years it became a first class university to which many top elite
pribumis even send their children to study.
The anger over the shootings of six students originally took the form of
anti government actions. By nightfall though, there were deliberate attempts
to divert this anger to the Chinese Indonesians. By May 14, 1998 the masses
exploded into general mayhem and anarchy.
Organized mobbing. A reconstruction by eyewitnesses revealed a consistent
pattern: First, arrangement were made to get the masses together at
strategic points near shopping or residential areas. This was done by
telephone, through public bus drivers and by word of mouth. Old tires or
timber were burned to attract more participants. Once enough people have
gathered, a group of provocateurs would arrive in trucks, armed with
crowbars to direct a well organized destruction. These provocateurs were a
mixture of young men dressed in the uniform of high school or university
students, obvious criminals with tattoos, stoutly built men sporting crew
cuts and wearing military boots. These groups would yell anti Chinese
Indonesian slogans to provoke maximum destruction. A resident of Bintaro
area described how three instigators on motorcycle arrived with the masses
running behind them. Pointing at houses left and right, these provocateurs
yelled "Burn, burn, burn". A number of Chinese Indonesians who hid in their
homes were burnt to death.
The masses were driven into a frenzy. They were provoked into entering
shops, were invited to loot to their heart's content while the instigators
remained outside. Their role was to initiate the burning of more buildings
and destruction of consumer goods and cars. It was these provocateurs who
burned down shopping centers while the poor and unemployed were trapped
inside, and burnt to death. In Medan this same pattern of organized rioting
was apparent. Ditto during the July 27, 1997 demonstrations supporting
Megawati the daughter of Sukarno. This originally peaceful demonstration
also degenerated into a burning and looting, activities which weren't at all
typical of her supporters.
Pay attention to the military reshuffling. In March 1998 Prabowo was
promoted by his father in law, Suharto, from his command post of the dreaded
7,500 strong red berrets KOPASSUS ( Special Forces) to become Commander of
the 27,000 strong Green Berrets in KOSTRAD (the powerful strategic forces).
This is the same post Soeharto was holding when he ousted Sukarno back in
1965. But on May 23, 1998, shortly after Suharto's resignation, Prabowo was
quietly relieved of this powerful post by General Wiranto, the Commander of
the Armed forces. It is reported that Prabowo went to complain to Habibie
accompanied by truckloads of fully armed and trained soldiers but was not
recieved by him. Wiranto, is apparently consolidating his position in the
post-Suharto era. Some of Prabowo's close associates were also replaced by
pro Wiranto men. No official explanation was given for these sudden power
shifts. It was rumored that they had something to do with student
disappearances and killings but nothing had been officially admitted. Recall
that last February 1998, when Wiranto replaced General Feisal Tanjung, as
the Commander of Armed Forces, the first wave of food riots abruptly
stopped. As the new incoming Commander, Wiranto condemned any rioting
including those directed against Chinese Indonesians. He was also among the
first to personally assess the damage in Medan after the three days anti
Chinese Indonesian rioting.
The Roots of the anti Chinese Indonesian sentiment
A. The Economic factors:
- The Suharto era at first represented an era of unprecedented economic
progress with massive foreign capital inflows. Per capita income grew at an
astounding 6 to 8 percent annually for three decades. In 1996 the per capita
GDP was raised to $1,150. It also created a middle class of 20 million
people, about ten percent of the entire population today. By the early
1990's Indonesia was raised to the level of a middle income country. The
percentage of Indonesians living in absolute poverty (i.e. those living
below $1 a day) was reduced from 60% to 11%.
In spite of these achievements, the distribution of income continued to be
skewed. At the top of the scale is Suharto family and his cronies. His
Chinese Indonesian cronies are said to own nine of the top 10 business
groups in the country. These top groups became rich beyond any world
standards. Why would these Chinese Indonesians collude with Suharto? One
Chinese Indonesian medium income earner explains: 'Typically, Suharto's
clique would approach Chinese Indonesians who are successful in very
lucrative business sectors and demand to become a partner. If you refuse,
your business is doomed, because being the ruler, they will create
difficulties for you. Chinese Indonesians don't have too much choices in
earning a living other than in the business sectors."
It is hard to get an objective evaluation of the role of Chinese
Indonesians in the nation's economy. This is so because of paucity of
reliable statistics, perhaps due to the non transparent character of
Suharto's government style. Statistics disseminated by the western media are
controversial and inaccurate due to the fact that reporters aren't
accountable for the accuracy of their reports as much as researchers might.
Western media, like anti Chinese Muslim and other elements, tends to lump
all Chinese Indonesian into one socio economic class together. This is very
misleading! Chinese Indonesians make up about 3.5% of the total Indonesian
population or 7 million people. Population wise, those Chinese Indonesians
who are reported to own some of the top 300 groups make up only a tiny drop
of this 7 million. Aside from that, there are many bonafide, non colluding
Chinese Indonesian businessmen who cannot even compete with the colluding
top people because they are not connected to Suharto et al, like Dharmala,
Rodamas, Sinar Mas, and Jan Darmadi.
The rest of the 7 millions are Chinese Indonesians of small and medium
income. Some are shopkeepers, some professional workers. All Chinese
Indonesians suffer equally as bad as any other Indonesian from the financial
crisis. But the Chinese Indonesians with small and medium income are in
addition hit severely by the riots. Most of the looted and vandalized
victims lost their entire belongings, and yet they were the least to benefit
from Soeharto's cronyism and collusion!
In 1996 the share of the national wealth of the lowest 40% declined from
21% in 1990 to 19% in 1996. The gap between rich and poor had been widening.
Now, the financial crisis which was externally induced shattered all these
achievements. Prior to the crisis, the already lopsided situation had
sparked riots in many places in Indonesia. The financial crisis, which
started with the Thai collapse of its real estate and banking sector on 2
July 1997 swiftly spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea.
It was caused by a sudden loss of confidence in the international market.
After pouring money in short term loans at a rate which these economies
could not sustain, these fund owners decided to withdraw their money. In 6
months they withdrew $ 110 billion US dollars from these countries. It
caused a panic in the exchange markets of the region, leading to a collapse
in their currencies.
Because of political factors, Indonesia was the hardest hit. The interplay
between Suharto and the IMF , delayed the recovery process and became a self
propelling process of doom and decline. While reforms swiftly took place in
other countries, the IMF had to go through three agreements with Indonesia.
One in October 1997, and two in January March of this year. The IMF and the
US believed that Suharto was not complying with the agreed conditions. These
include the dismantling of monopolies controlled by Suharto's children and
cronies. The rupiah exchange rate to the dollar depreciated from Rp.2,500 in
July 1997 to Rp.11,000 in January 1998. It even went to Rp.17,000 when
Habibie was announced to be the new vice president. By contrast, the
regional exchange rates to the US dollar only doubled, i.e. The Thai baht
from Baht.25.90 to Baht 38.30, the Korean won declined in value from Won 885
to Won 1,383 to the dollar. Conversely, at a rupiah rate of Rp.8,000 to the
dollar, about 95% of banks and 90 percent of Indonesia' businesses are
technically bankrupt. Massive layoffs compounded the problems and helped
create the explosive situation. The people were told that it was Suharto and
the Chinese conglomerates who borrowed abroad and refuse to pay back and
that they are now laying off workers by the millions.
Another factor was that Indonesia, while achieving rapid economic growth,
remained at the bottom of the ladder in per capita income figures of the
East Asian miracle. In 1996, per capita incomes showed the following
figures: Korea, $10,500, Malaysia: $4,650; Thailand $3,020, and Indonesia
$1,090. It goes without saying that the financial crisis will return
Indonesia to the ranks of the low income countries for most of the 1998-2002
period (the cut-off point is $750 per head). There will also be a
proportionate fall in consumption per head, which is expected to reach a low
of $350 per capita this year. The number of Absolute Poor is estimated to
rise from 18 million in 1996 to 40 million by the end of 1998. The
resignation of Suharto and the formation of a new cabinet by Habibie have
yet to bring back international confidence in Indonesia. The rupiah remains
stubbornly at the 10,000 level to the dollar, prolonging the economic
B. The religious factors:
The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, between 3 and 4%, are either
Buddhist/Taoist or Christian while the majority, 87% are Moslem. The rest,
about 10 % or 20 million people are pribumi Christian, Hindus (in Bali) or
animist. As stated in my earlier article,(see Michael Ocorandi, ibid), the
relation between ethnic Chinese and pribumis were seldom strained in Hindu
or Christian areas such as Bali, Manado, Tapanuli, internal Kalimantan,
Maluku, Flores, Timor or West Irian. The riots took place mainly in Muslim
dominated areas. In the January-February riots, more than one hundred
Christian churches and several Buddhists temples were destroyed along with
ethnic Chinese property.
The current power struggle. New President Habibie endeared himself to the
Muslims because he founded ICMI, an association of young Muslim
intellectuals meant to counterbalance the Catholic dominated Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The latter, set up by Catholic
intellectuals, became Suharto's major think tank, as a reward to the
Christian intellectuals for helping Suharto to defeat Sukarno and the
communists in 1965. The Moslems have always felt marginalized by the
doctrine of the military. This doctrine was based on anti communism, anti
Moslem fundamentalism and anti political liberalism. The retention of
General Wiranto as Minister of Defense cum Armed forces commander is a plus
factor for the ethnic Chinese. There is also the technocrat group led by
economic Czar Ginanjar Kartasasmita, respected by the IMF and the
International community. Along with five other economic ministers he made a
statement last Saturday demanding early elections. From his first days in
office Habibie appears to be more of a caretaker president. Meanwhile
tensions will continue between fanatic Muslims and more moderate secular
elements. Ethnic Chinese should therefore continue to be vigilant. Today
(May 28) fresh anti-Chinese riots are again reported from Medan.
The first showdown between pro and anti Habibie forces took place at the
parliament building last weekend. The pro democracy students were still
occupying the building. Although Suharto has resigned, they demanded
elections. Suddenly, Friday, May 22, 1998, thousands of pro Habibie
demonstrators arrived on the scene and provoked a confrontation. These men
wore fundamentalist scarfs a la Yasser Arafat. They were identified as the
same group which was set lose against Sofyan Wanandi and the CSIS last
January. (see Michael Ocorandi, ibid.). Most likely, their goal was to
create a confrontation with bloody casualties in hope of provoking military
hardliners to move in and crack down for the sake of 'national security'. A
constant refrain of the Suharto rule. Fortunately, the confrontation was
averted by troops who were told to use maximum restraint by their commander
C. The legal factors:
The legal status of Chinese Indonesians. Legally, the Dutch classified the
ethnic-Chinese as a a distinct group in their policy of divide et impera.
This exacerbated an already existing problem. After independence, the China
at first considered overseas Chinese as their nationals, by virtue of the
jus sanguinis (blood law) principle. Later the China shifted to the jus soli
(law of the land) which is the basis of nationality in most countries of the
world. A Sino-Indonesian treaty was signed in 1955. Under this law, from
January 1960 to January 1962 the ethnic-Chinese in Indonesia had to choose
between Indonesian or Chinese nationalities. An estimated 65 to 70% opted
for Indonesian nationality. Premier Zhou En Lai exhorted overseas Chinese to
adopt the countries where they live as their homeland. Problems concerning
citizenship continued to surface since Suharto took power. Relations with
People's China Republic were suspended in 1965 because of alleged complicity
of China in the aborted coup d'etat by the Indonesian communist party.
Suharto unilaterally abrogated the treaty on nationality in 1969. On August
8, 1990, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed to mark the restoration of
relations between the two countries. This was to settle the citizenship of a
remaining 300,000 ethnic Chinese still holding Chinese passports.
Because of this complicated past, understandably, China takes a hands off
attitude in the recent anti Chinese Indonesian riots. It claims that the
racism was an internal affair of Indonesia. Only Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, the
Chief Administrator of Hong Kong condemned it, calling it a black mark for
Indonesia. Indeed it is.
In 1965 Suharto deprived the Chinese Indonesians of their human rights.
Chinese organizations, schools, books, movies and music containing Chinese
characters were banned. As stated above, the only Chinese Indonesian
university, Trisakti, was burned to the ground while its founders, the
Chinese Indonesian association BAPERKI was banned for alleged links to
communists. Celebration of Chinese New Year in public and performance of
religious rites at Chinese temples were prohibited. Pribumis taunting, name
calling and bullying of Chinese Indonesians on the street add to constant
racial tension. The word Cina, which has a derogatory connotation in
Indonesia, replaced the more civilized word Tionghwa, humiliating the ethnic
Chinese community on a daily basis. Ethnic Chinese were pressured to use
Indonesian names. Hypocritically, Indonesian names or not, the pribumi and
on some issues the Indonesian government continue to treat them as Chinese.
At the same time, the Indonesianization process among the younger
generation of Chinese Indonesians accelerated. This, coupled with the rise
of the pribumi middle class gave rise to increasing interaction between the
two races who attend universities like Trisakti and Atmajaya together.
Intermarriage increases among those who studied together abroad and have the
same religion. Therefore, the recent anti Chinese Indonesian riots came as a
big shock especially to the younger generation. Many of them were not even
aware that they are actually of Chinese descent.
Where do we go from here?
The pain from the anti ethnic-Chinese riots will linger long after the
debris and car wrecks have been removed. The question uppermost on the mind
of the ethnic Chinese is where to go from here. Some will opt for emigration
to Australia, Singapore or other places. However, for the vast majority of
the 7-8 million Chinese Indonesians, this not a viable solution. Even those
wealthy enough to emigrate have their roots in Indonesia. Many who
temporarily fled are waiting for the right moment to return. Scores have
already returned. After all, they are all legitimate citizens of Indonesia.
They have the right to live in Indonesia. Meanwhile, short term and long
term measures should be adopted:
A. Short term measures:
Given the depth of the suffering, Chinese Indonesian leaders such as Kwik
Kian Gie and opposition group leaders such as Amien Rais should pressure for
reform. Chinese Indonesian leaders and the student leaders should demand
from the new government a thorough investigation of the murder of the six
students, of ethnic-Chinese and pribumis who were burned to death in the
riots. They must demand investigation of the instigators of the riots which
also caused economical damage estimated at $1 billion. The culprits must be
tried and convicted so that they will not again repeat their beastly acts.
Chinese Indonesian conglomerate owners should establish a social fund for
providing medical and material aid for victims of the violence and assisting
those who lost their property during the riots.
The new government should be pressured to provide low interest loans to
all who suffered property damage, pribumi and Chinese Indonesians alike, to
rebuilt their shattered businesses.
It may be unpopular for the government to do so since the fanatic Muslim
want to get all Chinese Indonesians out. And yet it is in their own interest
to rebuilt the shattered distribution and service system in Indonesia.
During his visit to devastated Glodok (Chinatown) in Jakarta, the President
was told so by first hand victims of the riots.
All huaren of all nationalities, in and outside Indonesia should publicize
the plight of the suffering Chinese Indonesians to institutions such as
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights ( see template letter in ) and the
B. Long term measures:
A crucial aspect is the issue of accommodation or assimilation of the
ethnic-Chinese community in South East Asia.
In Malaysia and Brunei, with ethnic-Chinese populations at 29.6% and 16%
each, the governments adopts a policy of accommodation. The ethnic Chinese
are allowed to retain their cultural identity but must learn the national
language.By contrast, in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, with
populations of Chinese minority estimated at 3.5, 1.3 and 8.6 per cent
respectively, the policy of assimilation has been adopted. In both Thailand
and Indonesia the ethnic Chinese were required to change their names.
Assimilation refers to "a blending process whereby two distinct groups form
a homogeneous entity". Within the term assimilation, the term
"incorporation" has been used to refer to Indonesia while "amalgamation" is
more prevalent in Thailand and the Philippines. The latter is more inclusive
and was made easier in these two countries where the ethnic Chinese are
largely of the same religion as the "host" country, i.e. Buddhism in
Thailand and Catholicism in the Philippines. Our Malaysian huaren friends
who advocate insistence on a huaren identity for Indonesian Chinese might
find this a sacrilege to preach. But to continue harping on their
Chinese-ness in the wake of open and mounting hostility for a variety of
reasons will be tactless.
The Thai/Philippines option of amalgamation already works in pockets of
Christianity and Hinduism in East Indonesia and Bali. It could and should
also work in parts where secular Islam is tolerant towards other religions
and where the economic and legal processes will assist such as in Central
and East Java. It should be noted that the modernist Moslem leader Amien
Rais, who is head of the 28 million strong Muhamadyah movement has on
several occasions strongly condemned anti ethnic Chinese riots. General
Wiranto, also a modernist, has also condemned anti ethnic-Chinese riots. His
consolidation to power is a reassuring factor. President Habibie in his much
publicized visit to Chinatown in Jakarta emphatically stated that racism and
religious discrimination have no place in Indonesia.
Economically, there is no doubt that corruption, nepotism and cronyism
only benefit a tiny number of Chinese Indonesians who manage to become close
to Suharto and his family. Chinese Indonesians must work together with the
pribumis to create a strong middle class. Malaysia introduced a successful
policy of promoting Bumiputras ( the Malaysian term for pribumis) after the
riots of May 13, 1969 (exactly the date when all hell broke lose in Jakarta
this year!). Since then, rapid economic growth in that country had lifted
the Bumiputras incomes to such levels that many of them are among the top
classes even though Chinese still predominate. The high per capita income in
Malaysia at $4,650 is also a stabilizing factor as they have been successful
to abolish the absolute poverty level altogether. Indonesia's new government
must at all cost do away with nepotism, cronyism, collusion and corruption.
Finally it should be noted that the fall of Suharto is just the beginning
of a long process of reform. All his connections and tentacles which have
been carefully forged for 33 years are still intact. The secret military
units engaged in murder, torture and disappearances, the gangs which can
morph one day into riots' instigators, the next day into some mobs provoking
confrontation with the students are still there. In his first years of
power, Suharto received pats in the back from the US and other countries for
having defeated communism. In fact the US until recently provided military
training for Indonesia's anti terrorist units. A battle will be fought out
between fanatic Muslim forces, hoping for a final victory over the armed
forces doctrine, and reformist groups including secular elements in the
army, who are opting for a continuation of the secular state with an
accommodation of all forces including the Christians and the Chinese.
Although Habibie is strongly supported by Islamic forces, he can not deliver
to the IMF and to the market forces by playing an anti ethnic-Chinese stance
strongly advocated by his fanatic religious backers. This message should be
very clear at least to the economic Czar of his government, the well
respected Ginanjar Kartasasmita and his team.
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