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Date: Tue, 2 Jun 1998 22:12:53 -0400
Reply-To: Benny Widyono <benny.widyono@worldnet.att.net>
Sender: Southeast Asia Discussion List <SEASIA-L@msu.edu>
From: Benny Widyono <benny.widyono@WORLDNET.ATT.NET>
Subject: Re: article from www.huaren.org
To: Multiple recipients of list SEASIA-L <SEASIA-L@msu.edu>

An Analysis of the Implication of Suharto's resignation for Chinese Indonesians

By M. Ocorandi, Worldwide HuaRen Peace Mission, 28 May 1998

  • Suharto's sudden resignation gives us time to pause and assess what is in for the future. The resignation is seen as only the beginning of a process of change in Indonesia which will influence the position of Chinese Indonesians, the majority of which will continue to stay in Indonesia, their homeland.
  • In the first 2 months of this year, Chinese Indonesians shopkeepers in about forty small towns and hamlets were target of violent riots. Then followed daily student demonstrations directed against Suharto. These students demand political and economic reforms and are not against Chinese Indonesians. At numerous occasions, the students made the emphatic statement that they do not loot, burn, nor persecute the Indonesian Chinese.
  • However, in the first week of May student demonstrations in Medan, North Sumatra, degenerated into mob violence against Chinese Indonesians, when the government announced massive hikes of electricity and gasoline rates in compliance with IMF's conditions for aid. A week later, it was Jakarta, which was turned into an inferno by angry mobs. A three days looting and burning followed the murder of six students at Trisakti university on May the 12th by snipers, till date identity still unknown although suspicions point in the direction of security forces.
  • About 500 people died, mostly looters who were trapped in shopping malls set ablaze by arsonists. The death toll includes un unknown number but at least some 20 Chinese Indonesians who tried to hide in their shops or were locked in by angry mobs who set the shops on fire. The riots spread to cities like Solo, Palembang, Tangerang and several other major cities. Chinese Indonesians who could afford it fled the country. The less fortunate: shopkeepers, street vendors selling fruit, vegetable, food etc. in Glodok, Jatinegara and elsewhere, lost everything they had. They cried and shook their heads, unable to make sense of the vicious racist attacks. Government sources estimated that more than 3,000 buildings, including Chinese Indonesian owned stores, homes and shopping malls, 959 cars and 500 motorcycles were destroyed or damaged during the insane rampage. Indonesia's Antara news agency put the damage at an estimated $1 billion.

Who was orchestrating these anti Chinese Indonesian riots?

  • There are similarities and differences between the first and second wave of riots. In both waves the target of violence has been Chinese Indonesian owned shops, homes and businesses. The difference though is, the first wave seemed to be perpetrated by desperate rural poor. The second wave, in Medan, Jakarta and other major towns, seemed to be the work of urban poor. This group has swollen as a direct consequence of massive layoffs caused by the country's financial crisis. This crisis is caused by the collapse of the rupiah, when its rate to the dollar went from Rp. 2,500 in early July 1997 to about Rp. 10,000 today.
  • Both waves of riots appeared at first glance to be spontaneous. But plenty of evidence suggest that both waves were very well organized. The first wave, the Food Riots, was preceded by frenzied verbal attacks by Indonesian officials. These officials publicly condemned Chinese Indonesians as "rats' and "traitors" who have committed "crimes" by "hoarding basic food supplies". Neither these officials, nor anyone else from the Indonesian government provided any evidence of such vicious racism, let alone educating the public that the sudden increase of prices for food and other essentials was directly related to the South East Asian crisis, and is not the fault of small retailers. These scapegoating tactics were obviously meant to divert anger away from the government in the wake of the rupiah's collapse. (See Michael Ocorandi, An Anatomy of the Recent Anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia, March 30, 1998, )
  • Regular Muslim religious sermons on Fridays, the prayer day of the week, were used as forums by Indonesian officials to attack the Chinese Indonesians. In late January 1998, after a Friday' prayer at Taman Sunda Kelapa Mosque, General Syarwan Hamid spoke of 'eradication of rats' who are not patriotic and at times of crisis "are salting away the fruits of our national development". Obviously he was referring to the Chinese Indonesians. This man has now become the new interior minister, courtesy of Habibie, the new president! Other speakers at the rally also condemned Chinese Indonesians: Adi Sasono, last week appointed as Minister of Cooperatives by Habibie, Sri Eddy Swasono and Achmad Tirtosudiro. To quote Habibie on May 27, 1998, as the new president he commits himself to the rebuilding of an Indonesia that is 'free from racism' during a visit to Jakarta&rsquo;s burnt out Chinatown. It remains to be seen whether this strong message is heeded by his newly appointed racist ministers and other well known racists.
  • On January 23, 1998, Lt. General Prabowo Sugianto, the son in law of President Suharto, held another such hate-rally in the guise of a religio= us meet. As is custom, during the fasting month, the Muslims every evening break their fast with a ceremony called Buka Puasa (Breaking the Fast.) On that day, in front of the five thousand Muslim leaders attending the ceremony, Prabowo blamed a 'political conspiracy' for the Indonesian financial crisis. He urged his fellow officers and Muslim leaders to "close ranks" in facing the challenges ahead. The challenges ahead were not identified but other speakers explicitly linked the conspirators to the "conglomerate group" and "their henchmen operating overseas.", two phrases which were clear references to the Chinese Indonesians. Topping this vicious racism, copies of "Lord of the Rim", a directory of Chinese owned businesses in Asia, were distributed.
  • One big unresolved question is the shooting of six innocent students on the campus of Trisakti University. General Wiranto categorically denied that the armed forces under his command killed these students. He insists that police and soldiers were only issued rubber bullets. Evidence shows the shootings were done by sharpshooters, using real bullets from the top of a superhighway that passes through the campus. It appears that separate units in the armed forces, unbeknown to Wiranto, could be responsible for these killing. A preliminary investigation point the finger at police forces. Could the same units also be responsible for the disappearances and torture of student activists? And why on earth would anyone want to risk such a major crisis against a background already highly volatile caused by sudden skyrocketing prices, massive layoffs, and hundreds of thousands of students demonstrating all over the country? Was it deliberately done to provoke an upheaval? If so, who could be the sinister mastermind?
  • The student demonstrations started as early as mid December 1997 and was growing in size day by day. They have been from the start pro democracy, pro reforms and are not directed against any ethnic group. Reminiscent of 1965, Christian students, including many Chinese Indonesians, and Muslim students demonstrated daily against the regime. If it weren't for the determination of these young students in their early 20's, it would have been much harder to get Suharto to resign!
  • Trisakti University, on whose campus the students' murder occured, was founded by BAPERKI, an organization of Chinese Indonesians during Sukarno times in respond to the discriminatory admission policy by Indonesian prestigious state universities. During the 1965 anti communist riots which brought Suharto to power, Trisakti was burned down and BAPERKI banned. Over the years it became a first class university to which many top elite pribumis even send their children to study.
  • The anger over the shootings of six students originally took the form of anti government actions. By nightfall though, there were deliberate attempts to divert this anger to the Chinese Indonesians. By May 14, 1998 the masses exploded into general mayhem and anarchy.
  • Organized mobbing. A reconstruction by eyewitnesses revealed a consistent pattern: First, arrangement were made to get the masses together at strategic points near shopping or residential areas. This was done by telephone, through public bus drivers and by word of mouth. Old tires or timber were burned to attract more participants. Once enough people have gathered, a group of provocateurs would arrive in trucks, armed with crowbars to direct a well organized destruction. These provocateurs were a mixture of young men dressed in the uniform of high school or university students, obvious criminals with tattoos, stoutly built men sporting crew cuts and wearing military boots. These groups would yell anti Chinese Indonesian slogans to provoke maximum destruction. A resident of Bintaro area described how three instigators on motorcycle arrived with the masses running behind them. Pointing at houses left and right, these provocateurs yelled "Burn, burn, burn". A number of Chinese Indonesians who hid in their homes were burnt to death.
  • The masses were driven into a frenzy. They were provoked into entering shops, were invited to loot to their heart's content while the instigators remained outside. Their role was to initiate the burning of more buildings and destruction of consumer goods and cars. It was these provocateurs who burned down shopping centers while the poor and unemployed were trapped inside, and burnt to death. In Medan this same pattern of organized rioting was apparent. Ditto during the July 27, 1997 demonstrations supporting Megawati the daughter of Sukarno. This originally peaceful demonstration also degenerated into a burning and looting, activities which weren't at all typical of her supporters.
  • Pay attention to the military reshuffling. In March 1998 Prabowo was promoted by his father in law, Suharto, from his command post of the dreaded 7,500 strong red berrets KOPASSUS ( Special Forces) to become Commander of the 27,000 strong Green Berrets in KOSTRAD (the powerful strategic forces). This is the same post Soeharto was holding when he ousted Sukarno back in 1965. But on May 23, 1998, shortly after Suharto's resignation, Prabowo was quietly relieved of this powerful post by General Wiranto, the Commander of the Armed forces. It is reported that Prabowo went to complain to Habibie accompanied by truckloads of fully armed and trained soldiers but was not recieved by him. Wiranto, is apparently consolidating his position in the post-Suharto era. Some of Prabowo's close associates were also replaced by pro Wiranto men. No official explanation was given for these sudden power shifts. It was rumored that they had something to do with student disappearances and killings but nothing had been officially admitted. Recall that last February 1998, when Wiranto replaced General Feisal Tanjung, as the Commander of Armed Forces, the first wave of food riots abruptly stopped. As the new incoming Commander, Wiranto condemned any rioting including those directed against Chinese Indonesians. He was also among the first to personally assess the damage in Medan after the three days anti Chinese Indonesian rioting.

The Roots of the anti Chinese Indonesian sentiment

A. The Economic factors:

  • The Suharto era at first represented an era of unprecedented economic progress with massive foreign capital inflows. Per capita income grew at an astounding 6 to 8 percent annually for three decades. In 1996 the per capita GDP was raised to $1,150. It also created a middle class of 20 million people, about ten percent of the entire population today. By the early 1990's Indonesia was raised to the level of a middle income country. The percentage of Indonesians living in absolute poverty (i.e. those living below $1 a day) was reduced from 60% to 11%.
  • In spite of these achievements, the distribution of income continued to be skewed. At the top of the scale is Suharto family and his cronies. His Chinese Indonesian cronies are said to own nine of the top 10 business groups in the country. These top groups became rich beyond any world standards. Why would these Chinese Indonesians collude with Suharto? One Chinese Indonesian medium income earner explains: 'Typically, Suharto's clique would approach Chinese Indonesians who are successful in very lucrative business sectors and demand to become a partner. If you refuse, your business is doomed, because being the ruler, they will create difficulties for you. Chinese Indonesians don't have too much choices in earning a living other than in the business sectors."
  • It is hard to get an objective evaluation of the role of Chinese Indonesians in the nation's economy. This is so because of paucity of reliable statistics, perhaps due to the non transparent character of Suharto's government style. Statistics disseminated by the western media are controversial and inaccurate due to the fact that reporters aren't accountable for the accuracy of their reports as much as researchers might.
  • Western media, like anti Chinese Muslim and other elements, tends to lump all Chinese Indonesian into one socio economic class together. This is very misleading! Chinese Indonesians make up about 3.5% of the total Indonesian population or 7 million people. Population wise, those Chinese Indonesians who are reported to own some of the top 300 groups make up only a tiny drop of this 7 million. Aside from that, there are many bonafide, non colluding Chinese Indonesian businessmen who cannot even compete with the colluding top people because they are not connected to Suharto et al, like Dharmala, Rodamas, Sinar Mas, and Jan Darmadi.
  • The rest of the 7 millions are Chinese Indonesians of small and medium income. Some are shopkeepers, some professional workers. All Chinese Indonesians suffer equally as bad as any other Indonesian from the financial crisis. But the Chinese Indonesians with small and medium income are in addition hit severely by the riots. Most of the looted and vandalized victims lost their entire belongings, and yet they were the least to benefit from Soeharto's cronyism and collusion!
  • In 1996 the share of the national wealth of the lowest 40% declined from 21% in 1990 to 19% in 1996. The gap between rich and poor had been widening. Now, the financial crisis which was externally induced shattered all these achievements. Prior to the crisis, the already lopsided situation had sparked riots in many places in Indonesia. The financial crisis, which started with the Thai collapse of its real estate and banking sector on 2 July 1997 swiftly spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea. It was caused by a sudden loss of confidence in the international market. After pouring money in short term loans at a rate which these economies could not sustain, these fund owners decided to withdraw their money. In 6 months they withdrew $ 110 billion US dollars from these countries. It caused a panic in the exchange markets of the region, leading to a collapse in their currencies.
  • Because of political factors, Indonesia was the hardest hit. The interplay between Suharto and the IMF , delayed the recovery process and became a self propelling process of doom and decline. While reforms swiftly took place in other countries, the IMF had to go through three agreements with Indonesia. One in October 1997, and two in January March of this year. The IMF and the US believed that Suharto was not complying with the agreed conditions. These include the dismantling of monopolies controlled by Suharto's children and cronies. The rupiah exchange rate to the dollar depreciated from Rp.2,500 in July 1997 to Rp.11,000 in January 1998. It even went to Rp.17,000 when Habibie was announced to be the new vice president. By contrast, the regional exchange rates to the US dollar only doubled, i.e. The Thai baht from Baht.25.90 to Baht 38.30, the Korean won declined in value from Won 885 to Won 1,383 to the dollar. Conversely, at a rupiah rate of Rp.8,000 to the dollar, about 95% of banks and 90 percent of Indonesia' businesses are technically bankrupt. Massive layoffs compounded the problems and helped create the explosive situation. The people were told that it was Suharto and the Chinese conglomerates who borrowed abroad and refuse to pay back and that they are now laying off workers by the millions.
  • Another factor was that Indonesia, while achieving rapid economic growth, remained at the bottom of the ladder in per capita income figures of the East Asian miracle. In 1996, per capita incomes showed the following figures: Korea, $10,500, Malaysia: $4,650; Thailand $3,020, and Indonesia $1,090. It goes without saying that the financial crisis will return Indonesia to the ranks of the low income countries for most of the 1998-2002 period (the cut-off point is $750 per head). There will also be a proportionate fall in consumption per head, which is expected to reach a low of $350 per capita this year. The number of Absolute Poor is estimated to rise from 18 million in 1996 to 40 million by the end of 1998. The resignation of Suharto and the formation of a new cabinet by Habibie have yet to bring back international confidence in Indonesia. The rupiah remains stubbornly at the 10,000 level to the dollar, prolonging the economic disaster.

B. The religious factors:

  • The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, between 3 and 4%, are either Buddhist/Taoist or Christian while the majority, 87% are Moslem. The rest, about 10 % or 20 million people are pribumi Christian, Hindus (in Bali) or animist. As stated in my earlier article,(see Michael Ocorandi, ibid), the relation between ethnic Chinese and pribumis were seldom strained in Hindu or Christian areas such as Bali, Manado, Tapanuli, internal Kalimantan, Maluku, Flores, Timor or West Irian. The riots took place mainly in Muslim dominated areas. In the January-February riots, more than one hundred Christian churches and several Buddhists temples were destroyed along with ethnic Chinese property.
  • The current power struggle. New President Habibie endeared himself to the Muslims because he founded ICMI, an association of young Muslim intellectuals meant to counterbalance the Catholic dominated Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The latter, set up by Catholic intellectuals, became Suharto's major think tank, as a reward to the Christian intellectuals for helping Suharto to defeat Sukarno and the communists in 1965. The Moslems have always felt marginalized by the doctrine of the military. This doctrine was based on anti communism, anti Moslem fundamentalism and anti political liberalism. The retention of General Wiranto as Minister of Defense cum Armed forces commander is a plus factor for the ethnic Chinese. There is also the technocrat group led by economic Czar Ginanjar Kartasasmita, respected by the IMF and the International community. Along with five other economic ministers he made a statement last Saturday demanding early elections. From his first days in office Habibie appears to be more of a caretaker president. Meanwhile tensions will continue between fanatic Muslims and more moderate secular elements. Ethnic Chinese should therefore continue to be vigilant. Today (May 28) fresh anti-Chinese riots are again reported from Medan.
  • The first showdown between pro and anti Habibie forces took place at the parliament building last weekend. The pro democracy students were still occupying the building. Although Suharto has resigned, they demanded elections. Suddenly, Friday, May 22, 1998, thousands of pro Habibie demonstrators arrived on the scene and provoked a confrontation. These men wore fundamentalist scarfs a la Yasser Arafat. They were identified as the same group which was set lose against Sofyan Wanandi and the CSIS last January. (see Michael Ocorandi, ibid.). Most likely, their goal was to create a confrontation with bloody casualties in hope of provoking military hardliners to move in and crack down for the sake of 'national security'. A constant refrain of the Suharto rule. Fortunately, the confrontation was averted by troops who were told to use maximum restraint by their commander Wiranto.

C. The legal factors:

  • The legal status of Chinese Indonesians. Legally, the Dutch classified the ethnic-Chinese as a a distinct group in their policy of divide et impera. This exacerbated an already existing problem. After independence, the China at first considered overseas Chinese as their nationals, by virtue of the jus sanguinis (blood law) principle. Later the China shifted to the jus soli (law of the land) which is the basis of nationality in most countries of the world. A Sino-Indonesian treaty was signed in 1955. Under this law, from January 1960 to January 1962 the ethnic-Chinese in Indonesia had to choose between Indonesian or Chinese nationalities. An estimated 65 to 70% opted for Indonesian nationality. Premier Zhou En Lai exhorted overseas Chinese to adopt the countries where they live as their homeland. Problems concerning citizenship continued to surface since Suharto took power. Relations with People's China Republic were suspended in 1965 because of alleged complicity of China in the aborted coup d'etat by the Indonesian communist party. Suharto unilaterally abrogated the treaty on nationality in 1969. On August 8, 1990, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed to mark the restoration of relations between the two countries. This was to settle the citizenship of a remaining 300,000 ethnic Chinese still holding Chinese passports.

    Because of this complicated past, understandably, China takes a hands off attitude in the recent anti Chinese Indonesian riots. It claims that the racism was an internal affair of Indonesia. Only Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, the Chief Administrator of Hong Kong condemned it, calling it a black mark for Indonesia. Indeed it is.

  • In 1965 Suharto deprived the Chinese Indonesians of their human rights. Chinese organizations, schools, books, movies and music containing Chinese characters were banned. As stated above, the only Chinese Indonesian university, Trisakti, was burned to the ground while its founders, the Chinese Indonesian association BAPERKI was banned for alleged links to communists. Celebration of Chinese New Year in public and performance of religious rites at Chinese temples were prohibited. Pribumis taunting, name calling and bullying of Chinese Indonesians on the street add to constant racial tension. The word Cina, which has a derogatory connotation in Indonesia, replaced the more civilized word Tionghwa, humiliating the ethnic Chinese community on a daily basis. Ethnic Chinese were pressured to use Indonesian names. Hypocritically, Indonesian names or not, the pribumi and on some issues the Indonesian government continue to treat them as Chinese.
  • At the same time, the Indonesianization process among the younger generation of Chinese Indonesians accelerated. This, coupled with the rise of the pribumi middle class gave rise to increasing interaction between the two races who attend universities like Trisakti and Atmajaya together. Intermarriage increases among those who studied together abroad and have the same religion. Therefore, the recent anti Chinese Indonesian riots came as a big shock especially to the younger generation. Many of them were not even aware that they are actually of Chinese descent.

Where do we go from here?

  • The pain from the anti ethnic-Chinese riots will linger long after the debris and car wrecks have been removed. The question uppermost on the mind of the ethnic Chinese is where to go from here. Some will opt for emigration to Australia, Singapore or other places. However, for the vast majority of the 7-8 million Chinese Indonesians, this not a viable solution. Even those wealthy enough to emigrate have their roots in Indonesia. Many who temporarily fled are waiting for the right moment to return. Scores have already returned. After all, they are all legitimate citizens of Indonesia. They have the right to live in Indonesia. Meanwhile, short term and long term measures should be adopted:

A. Short term measures:

  • Given the depth of the suffering, Chinese Indonesian leaders such as Kwik Kian Gie and opposition group leaders such as Amien Rais should pressure for reform. Chinese Indonesian leaders and the student leaders should demand from the new government a thorough investigation of the murder of the six students, of ethnic-Chinese and pribumis who were burned to death in the riots. They must demand investigation of the instigators of the riots which also caused economical damage estimated at $1 billion. The culprits must be tried and convicted so that they will not again repeat their beastly acts.
  • Chinese Indonesian conglomerate owners should establish a social fund for providing medical and material aid for victims of the violence and assisting those who lost their property during the riots.
  • The new government should be pressured to provide low interest loans to all who suffered property damage, pribumi and Chinese Indonesians alike, to rebuilt their shattered businesses.

    It may be unpopular for the government to do so since the fanatic Muslim want to get all Chinese Indonesians out. And yet it is in their own interest to rebuilt the shattered distribution and service system in Indonesia. During his visit to devastated Glodok (Chinatown) in Jakarta, the President was told so by first hand victims of the riots.

  • All huaren of all nationalities, in and outside Indonesia should publicize the plight of the suffering Chinese Indonesians to institutions such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ( see template letter in ) and the international press.

B. Long term measures:

  • A crucial aspect is the issue of accommodation or assimilation of the ethnic-Chinese community in South East Asia.

    In Malaysia and Brunei, with ethnic-Chinese populations at 29.6% and 16% each, the governments adopts a policy of accommodation. The ethnic Chinese are allowed to retain their cultural identity but must learn the national language.By contrast, in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, with populations of Chinese minority estimated at 3.5, 1.3 and 8.6 per cent respectively, the policy of assimilation has been adopted. In both Thailand and Indonesia the ethnic Chinese were required to change their names. Assimilation refers to "a blending process whereby two distinct groups form a homogeneous entity". Within the term assimilation, the term "incorporation" has been used to refer to Indonesia while "amalgamation" is more prevalent in Thailand and the Philippines. The latter is more inclusive and was made easier in these two countries where the ethnic Chinese are largely of the same religion as the "host" country, i.e. Buddhism in Thailand and Catholicism in the Philippines. Our Malaysian huaren friends who advocate insistence on a huaren identity for Indonesian Chinese might find this a sacrilege to preach. But to continue harping on their Chinese-ness in the wake of open and mounting hostility for a variety of reasons will be tactless.

  • The Thai/Philippines option of amalgamation already works in pockets of Christianity and Hinduism in East Indonesia and Bali. It could and should also work in parts where secular Islam is tolerant towards other religions and where the economic and legal processes will assist such as in Central and East Java. It should be noted that the modernist Moslem leader Amien Rais, who is head of the 28 million strong Muhamadyah movement has on several occasions strongly condemned anti ethnic Chinese riots. General Wiranto, also a modernist, has also condemned anti ethnic-Chinese riots. His consolidation to power is a reassuring factor. President Habibie in his much publicized visit to Chinatown in Jakarta emphatically stated that racism and religious discrimination have no place in Indonesia.
  • Economically, there is no doubt that corruption, nepotism and cronyism only benefit a tiny number of Chinese Indonesians who manage to become close to Suharto and his family. Chinese Indonesians must work together with the pribumis to create a strong middle class. Malaysia introduced a successful policy of promoting Bumiputras ( the Malaysian term for pribumis) after the riots of May 13, 1969 (exactly the date when all hell broke lose in Jakarta this year!). Since then, rapid economic growth in that country had lifted the Bumiputras incomes to such levels that many of them are among the top classes even though Chinese still predominate. The high per capita income in Malaysia at $4,650 is also a stabilizing factor as they have been successful to abolish the absolute poverty level altogether. Indonesia's new government must at all cost do away with nepotism, cronyism, collusion and corruption.
  • Finally it should be noted that the fall of Suharto is just the beginning of a long process of reform. All his connections and tentacles which have been carefully forged for 33 years are still intact. The secret military units engaged in murder, torture and disappearances, the gangs which can morph one day into riots' instigators, the next day into some mobs provoking confrontation with the students are still there. In his first years of power, Suharto received pats in the back from the US and other countries for having defeated communism. In fact the US until recently provided military training for Indonesia's anti terrorist units. A battle will be fought out between fanatic Muslim forces, hoping for a final victory over the armed forces doctrine, and reformist groups including secular elements in the army, who are opting for a continuation of the secular state with an accommodation of all forces including the Christians and the Chinese. Although Habibie is strongly supported by Islamic forces, he can not deliver to the IMF and to the market forces by playing an anti ethnic-Chinese stance strongly advocated by his fanatic religious backers. This message should be very clear at least to the economic Czar of his government, the well respected Ginanjar Kartasasmita and his team.

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