Date: Tue, 25 Aug 98 16:37:38 CDT
From: Ralph McGehee <>
Subject: CIABASE: Background to Terrorism
Organization: Institute for Global Communications
Article: 41837
To: undisclosed-recipients:;;
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A Background to Terrorism

By Ralph McGehee, CIABASE, 25 August 1998

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, 80-96 Blowback of CIA ops. CIA spent more than $3 billion dollars in 80s to train and fund the Afghan resistance—most venomously anti-Western—they form core of an international net of Islamic militants. CIA weaponry went to fundamentalist Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, one of the most anti-western leaders and until recently president of Afghanistan. His allies included Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, serving life in the U.S. for urban terrorism. Rami Ahmed Yousef, man accused of planning the bombing of the World Trade Center was trained in Afghanistan. The terrorist net has targeted Washington's most pivotal Islamic allies—claiming responsibility for the first terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia and some of the worst attacks in Pakistan. Christian Science Monitor 11/1/96 18

Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Support for Afghan members of, Ikhwan, a frequently violent Muslim brotherhood. Saddam Hussein of Iraq and Khadafi of Libya also supported more fanatic factions of Afghan Mujahaddin—but largest contributor of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar came from CIA. Huge amounts of U.S. aid also to Ahmed Shah Masood of Rabbani's Jamiat-I-Islami, both longtime advocates of pan-Islam. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 171

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 In 1987 the broad percentages of material allocated to the Islamic fundamentalist parties was between 67-73 per cent. Allocations to the parties were: Hekmatyar 18-20 per cent, Rabbani 18-19 per cent, Sayaf 17-18 per cent, Khalis 13-15 per cent, Nabi 13-15 per cent, Gailani 10-11 per cent, and Mujaddadi 3-5 per cent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 97,105,215

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-93 U.S. created a monster by supporting a rebellion based on religious zealotry. Several of those involved in World Trade Center bombing or plans to attack other targets participated in the Afghan rebellion as recruiters, trainers, or fighters. Abdel Rahman was reportedly a prolific recruiter per reports from Cairo. An Afghan link extends as well to a number of accused terrorists in Egypt, Algeria, and other Arab countries. Through Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence organization (ISI), CIA provided weapons, money and training for Afghan insurgents. Dispute over giving Stinger missiles. Morton Abramowitz, Director of the State Department's INR, now president of the Carneige Endowment for International Peace, was the leading advocate for supplying Stingers. CIA now seeking $55 million to purchase missiles that showing up on black market. Pakistan's ISI favored Hekmatyar—Pakistan agent for years—he now is prime minister of Afghanistan. Peshawar was center for insurgency/extremists and now they looking for new targets—such as the pro-West government in Egypt. Washington Times 7/26/93 a1,13

Afghanistan, 79-90 Mohammad Yousaf & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story. London, England: Leo Cooper. The book outlines CIA's support operation for the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan via Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's CIA. ISI funneled 70 per cent of all material aid—money, uniforms, weapons, including Stinger missiles, and demolitions—to radical Islamic fundamentalists. Now radical Islamic fundamentalism is our major problem. CIABASE report, Crisis of Democracy. 5/1/95

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-94 Covert CIA program to buy back U.S. Stinger missiles distributed to rebel forces in 80s plagued by failures, miscalculations and wasted money. Congress authorized more than $65 million for op over last 3 years. Despite the millions, CIA has recovered only a fraction and does not know who controls remaining weapons. Missiles supplied by CIA have turned up in Iran, Qatar and North Korea. Op turned into a fish market “CIA unable to recover most of the missiles.” One effort failed when Pakistani officials stormed into Afghanistan and seized the missiles—Afghan rebel chief so incensed his men kidnapped 2 (Chinese) engineers working with the Pakistani government and holds them for ransom. Foul-ups legendary in intelligence circles in Pakistan and tribal leaders in Afghanistan. Washington Post 3/7/94 a1,14

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 86 In March 86 U.S. began giving Stinger missiles to the Mujaheddin. Shift occurred after activists in Pentagon, and CIA backed by conservative senators, overcame opposition. Opponents argued that introducing U.S.-made arms into third world conflicts would escalate into U.S.-USSR conflicts and there no guarantee advanced weapons would not fall into terrorist hands. British Blowpipes also used. Washington Post 7/23/86 a1,12

Afghanistan, 90 Afghan guerrillas veto drive for Kabul. Pakistan's Inter-Services intelligence agency (ISI) preparing for offensive on Kabul to be led by Gulbaddin Hekmatar, a radical Moslem fundamentalist. ISI controls distribution of CIA and Saudi-supplied weapons. Aborted offensive reveals difference between CIA and the Department of State. State argued against assault, CIA officers urged the assault. Washington Post 11/4/90 a27,28

Afghanistan, Pakistan 80-90 Two part article based on information from intelligence officials: Pakistani General Mohammed Yousaf who wrote book “The Bear Trap;” and more than a dozen senior western officials. Three training camps near Afghan border where Mujaheddin fire heavy weapons and learn to make bombs with CIA-supplied plastic explosives. DCI Casey in 84, during visit convinced Pakistanis to ship propaganda through Afghanistan to USSR Muslim southern republics. CIA supplied thousands of Korans, as well as books on USSR atrocities. U.S. “chickened-out” on taking Afghan war into Soviet soil but Casey ruthless. Intel coup triggered decision to escalate. U.S. received highly specific, sensitive info re USSR war plans in Afghanistan. 3/85 NSDD 166, sharply escalated U.S. op by providing high technology military expertise. In 85 CIA gave extensive satellite reconnaissance data, plans for military ops based on satellite intelligence, intercepts of USSR communications, nets for rebels, delayed timing devices for tons of plastic explosives for urban sabotage, long-range sniper rifles, a targeting device for mortars linked to U.S. navy satellite, wire-guided anti-tank missiles, and Stinger missiles, etc. Washington Post 7/19/92 a1,6

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, USSR, 80-90 first years of the Reagan Administration, covert Afghan war handled out of (DCI) Casey's back pocket. By 85 U.S. increase in U.S. arms supplies—rose to 65,000 tons annually by 87 as well as a ceaseless stream of CIA and P Pentagon specialists to ISI Headquarters near Rawalpindi who helped plan ops by as many as 11 ISI teams trained and supplied by CIA who accompanied Mujaheddin across border. Teams attacked airports, railroads, fuel depots, electricity pylons, bridges and roads. Washington Post 7/19/92 a1,6

Pakistan, Afghanistan, 81-92 A basic course on Who's Who of Mujahaddin. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 6-4

Afghanistan, Germany, 86 A Kuwaitian is trained in explosives, gets false Afghanistan papers made by the CIA in the Frankfurt Headquarters (Dept. of Army Detachment), is flown to Pakistan, goes from there to Afghanistan. Der Speigel 10/6/86.

Afghanistan, 79-90 Mujaheddin commanders inside Afghanistan control huge fields of opium poppies and reap harvest of as much as four million pounds of opium a year. By 89 Afghanistan and Pakistan produced as much heroin as rest of world combined. Weiner, T. (1990). Blank Check: The Pentagon's Black Budget 151-152

Afghanistan, 82 Sales of opium fund Afghan rebels. The DEA said 52% of the heroin brought into the U.S. last year is believed to have come from the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. U.S. policy contradictory it wants to fight the drug traffic and to drive the USSR out of Afghanistan. 250 to 300 tons opium were produced in Afghanistan in 1981 . That quantity could be converted into 25 to 30 tons of heroin. Processing done in Pakistan. Drug traffickers in U.S. import 4 to 4 1/2 tons of heroin a year. Washington Post 12/17/83

Afghanistan, 86 a Department of State report describes Afghanistan and the bordering tribal areas of Pakistan as “the world's leading source of illicit heroin exports to the US and Europe. The sale of this opium plays an important part in the finances of the CIA-backed Afghan rebels. New York Times 6/20/86 from Intel Parapolitics 9/86 p7

Afghanistan, 89 The Administration is dickering over how best to arm the Mujahedeen. Areas controlled by them include some of the most fertile centers of opium production. DOS report circa 3/89 said Afghanistan produced 700 to 800 metric tons of opium 88, most from territory held by rebels. Representative Bill McCollum hit CIA over handling of mujahedeen and working through Pakistan's intelligence service. The Nation 10/16/89 412

Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan. (Golden Crescent) accounts for 75% all heroin in U.S. In 1983 4.5 tons heroin came to the U.S. from the Golden Crescent. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action Quarterly) Summer 87 11

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 80-90 17 DEA agents assigned to the U.S. embassy in Islamabad. DEA reports identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan. Despite high quality of DEA intelligence, not a major syndicate investigated by Pakistani police in a decade. Hekmatyar himself controlled six heroin refineries. Without fear of arrest heroin dealers began exporting product to Europe and America, capturing more than 50% of both markets. When Pakistani police picked up Hamid Hasnain, V.P. of gvt's Habib bank, they found in his briefcase the personal records of president Zia. Blatant official corruption continued until General Zia's death in an air crash. Typical of misinformation that blocked any U.S. action against Pakistan's heroin trade, the State Department's semi-annual narcotics review in September called General Zia a strong supporter of anti-narcotics activities in Pakistan. McCoy, A.W. (1991). The Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 456

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 85-90 U.S. government avoids investigating drug trade run by Afghan resistance movement. Government has info re heroin deals Gulbaddin Hekmatjar, leader of mujaheddin but takes no action. Barnett Rubin of Yale based on Washington Post story: “people attempting research this connection receive hardly any support. Our relationship with Pakistani military is centerpiece our strategic presence in Southern Asia and even in the Persian Gulf.” Article outlines movement of weapons and drugs via Pakistani ISI and the National Logistic Cell (NLC) entirely owned by Pakistani army. top secret s/a-90 17-18

From about 48-91 CIA involved in drug traffic at 3 levels: 1) coincidental Complicity through covert alliances with groups actively engaged in drugs; 2) support of traffic by covering up for drug lord allies; 3) active engagement in transport of opium and heroin. From Burma's opium traffic in 50s and growth of golden triangle in sea in 60s and 70s U.S. role a catalyst. in 5/80 Dr. David Musto, angry. In late 77 he was on Carter's White House Strategy Council on Drug Abuse. Next two years CIA and other intelligence agencies denied Council access to all classified info on drug traffic. CIA lied about dollar role of drugs. Dr. Joyce Lowinson another Council member in New York Times op-ed criticized policy. Both Musto and Lowinson worried about drugs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Drug Enforcement Agency investigated surge of drugs from southern Asia. Drug traffic in U.S. in large part due to failure Drug Enforcement Agency's interdiction and CIA's covert ops. CIA ops transformed southern Asia to major supplier of world heroin. By 1988 there an estimated 100 to 200 heroin refineries in the Kyber district alone. Trucks from Pakistani army's logistics with CIA arms often returned loaded with heroin—protected with papers from Pakistan's ISI. Drug Enforcement Agency said there were 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan. Annual earnings $8 to 10 billion. Progressive 7/91 20-26. From Alfred McCoy's book, Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in Global drug trade, a revised edition to be published in July 1991

Drug Enforcement Agency December 83 says Afghanistan rebels are financing their battle at least partially through sale opium, some of which comes to U.S. in form of heroin. David Melodic, Drug Enforcement Agency's congressional liaison said 52% of heroin brought into U.S. last year believed to have come from area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. American interests Afghanistan contradictory over fighting drug traffic and political goals. Washington Post 12/17/83

Pakistan, Afghanistan, 79-89 The Mujahedden rebels keep their cause going through the sale of opium. Drug Enforcement Agency spokesman said “no less than half of all U.S. heroin came from that area of the world.” Gulbaddin Hekmatyar is responsible for murdering hundreds of dedicated resistance fighters, political workers, and intellectuals. He reportedly was a leading figure in the heroin trade. Details of corruption emerged from U.S. sources only after the Soviets began pulling out of Afghanistan. By 1989, Pakistan had no fewer than 100 heroin labs near the border of Afghanistan. CIA had used a Lebanese-controlled currency firm in Zurich, Shakarchi Trading to channel aid to the Afghan rebels. Marshall, j. (1991). drug Wars 49-52

Southern Asia, 80-90 during 80s CIA ops in Afghanistan transformed South Asia from a self-contained opium zone to major supplier heroin on the world market. Saudi Arabia delivered their aid directly to client guerrilla groups inside Afghanistan, most allied agencies, the CIA included, worked through General Zia's [of Pakistan], Inter Service Intel (ISI). CIA relationship with ISI complex, CIA commanded vast arsenal of funds and high-tech weapons that dwarfed ISI's meager budget. McCoy, A.W. (1991). the Politics Of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Traffic 49

Pakistan-Afghanistan border and Iran, 81 the Golden Crescent area where most heroin coming into U.S. in book “Weltmacht Droge” Austrian journalist Hans Georg Behr shows the connection between aid provided by Western intelligence agencies and increased heroin shipping to West. He spent two weeks with Afghan rebels who smuggling opium to Pakistan. Money exchanged for arms. Counterspy 10/81 29-30

Pakistan, Afghanistan, 84 Bush meets with the leader of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and Bush agreed for 3.2 billion in new US aid over and above the 2 billion allocated to the Afghan op. Yet by 1984, according to European police sources, Pakistan was furnishing 70% of the world's supply of high-grade heroin. CIA's arms pipeline to Afghan mujahedeen is organized and coordinated by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. The main carrier is the national logistic cell, owned by the Pakistan army, it is the largest transport org in the country. US has 17 officers in Pakistan who work exclusively on narcotics. The DEA contingent includes several CIA officers. CIA has gathered intelligence on narcotics since 75. European police who work with DEA claim that US agents have identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in Pakistan yet none have been broken up in past ten years. Nation article gives a background paragraph on the history of CIA ops and drug traffic. The Nation 11/14/88 477,492,94-6

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 86-87 CIA supplying counterfeit Afghan money for several years. It acquired an excellent set of plates without a blemish. CIA bills arrive in Pakistan and are sold for full value in Peshawar and Quetta. Jack Anderson, Washington Post 5/4/87

81-92 Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Because of relationship between DCI Casey and General Acktar, CIA became advisor and supplier of aid to Mujahaddin. CIA personnel in Pakistan, were notoriously unlearned in culture and political atmosphere of Afghans. CIA supported Gulbaddin and Ahmed Ahah Masood at the expense of other Afghans who had a much broader-based constituency. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 163

Afghanistan, 76-89 A criticism of the CIA's handling of the op in Afghanistan by Bill McCollum, Republican congressman from Florida and chairman of a GOP task force on terrorism and unconventional warfare. After 10 years and nearly $2 billion in American aid culminating in a monumentally incompetent program of arms procurement and distribution. Hekmatyar's party—recipient of much of much of the aid—implicated in dozens of disappearances and outright murders of rival commanders and Afghan intellectuals. Hekmatyar loyal to Pakistan's ISI that acts as a proxy for CIA. Washington Post 9/10/89 c-1,4

USSR, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 82-87 DCI Casey renewed acquaintance with General Acktar Abdul Rahman Khan. During tenure Casey made 6 trips to coordinate with Acktar. Casey considered himself commander-in-chief against USSR in Afghan. Within 2 years after 1st visit, CIA station in Islamabad became largest in world outside of Langley Headquarters. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory 52

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 81-92 Reed Irvine of Committee for a Free Afghanistan, and Andy Eiva, started a letterhead org called Afghan-American Federation. Federation helpful in finding doctors and hospitals that would take severely wounded. Committee also hired people to advise the Mujahaddin military. One was Ted Mataksis who also advised re Central America and Cambodian rebels. Lohbeck, K. (1993). Holy War, Unholy Victory

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 60-90 ISI's Headquarters in a large camp of 70-80 acres north of Rawalpindi, 12 kilometers from Islamabad. Inside high walls were offices, transit warehouse through which passed 70 percent of all arms and ammo for the Mujahideen, at least 300 vehicles, several acres of training area, a psywar unit, barracks, messhalls and the Stinger training school. This called Ojhri camp. General Akhtar set up another organization for the provision of clothing and rations purchased in huge quantities throughout Pakistan, with CIA money. Major contribution from CIA to Afghan war was satellite intelligence through photographs. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). the Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 27,29, 93

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 There were seven Afghan resistance parties formed into an alliance. Political heads of each party called a leader to distinguish from the Mujahideen military commanders. Alliance established after 83. until the Quetta incident, commanders usually received supplies directly from ISI. Supplies then channeled through the parties. Gulbadin Hekmatyar is the youngest and toughest of alliance leaders. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). the Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 40-1

Afghanistan, Pakistan, 85-92 Islamic fundamentalist Gulbaddin Hekmatyar per General Yousaf by 87 received only about 20% of annual allocations of money and weapons. All 4 fundamentalist parties combined received 75%, leaving small amounts for the three moderate parties. U.S. covert program in Afghanistan effectively ended 1/1/92. Program a success. Washington Post 7/20/92 a1,12

Afghanistan, Pakistan, USSR, 80-90 A discussion of the weapons and equipment pipeline. It in three distinct parts with the CIA owning the first part, the purchase and transport of weapons to Pakistan. Second part ISI's responsibility—getting everything carried across Pakistan, allocated to, and handed over to the parties at their Headquarters near Peshawar and Quetta. The third leg was the parties allocated weapons to their commanders and distributed inside Afghanistan. On 1987 the broad percentages allocated to the parties were Hekmatyar 18-20 percent, Rabbani 18-19 per cent, Sayaf 17-18 per cent, Khalis 13-15 percent, Nabi 13-15 percent, Gailani 10-11 percent, and Mujaddadi 3-5 percent. Fundamentalists received a total of 67-73 percent. Mohammad Yousai & Adkin, M. (1992). The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story 97, 105